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What is Still "Radical" in the Antislavery
Legal Practice of Salmon P. Chase?
MATTHEW A. AXTELL*

Introduction
One summer night in rural Ohio circa 1843, a former abolitionist
named Eber D. Howe would tell readers years later, the law was no match
for an angry crowd of white men set on freeing a young African-American
man from bondage. His story went this way:
In 1841, Milton Clarke, a bugle-playing former steamboat hand
claimed as the "human chattel" of a white Kentucky man, had crossed into
Ohio and eventually reunited with his brother Lewis, another refugee from
the Bluegrass State. Equipped with real-life tales of brutal whippings and
the forced and division sale of African-American families, the Clarke
brothers became what one later historian would call "professional fugitive"
slaves,' traveling between white church congregations on the abolitionist
speaking circuit around the Great Lakes Region. On August 3rd, 1843,
however, after giving one of his talks in Lake County, Ohio, Milton Clarke
was run off the road by a carriage holding four white men, the agents of
Archibald Logan, his putative master. The four men beat Clarke and then
hauled him to a tavern for a hearing before a local judge, obtaining a court
order allowing them to transport him back to Kentucky. A local group of
"thoroughgoing" white abolitionists then sprang into action, obtaining a
writ for assault and battery in an adjacent town made out against Clarke's
* Judicial Fellow, Supreme Court of the United States and Samuel I. Golieb Fellow in Legal
History, New York University School of Law. Special thanks to Erin Braatz, Barry Cushman,
Risa Goluboff, Robert W. Gordon, Hendrik Hartog, Justene Hill, Kristen A. Hite, Dan Holt,
Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Jennifer D. Jones, Gerald Leonard, Jessica Lowe, Kenneth Mack, Charles
McCurdy, William E. Nelson, James Oakes, Bruce Ragsdale, Daniel T. Rodgers, and Sean
Wilentz for their special contributions in helping me to conceptualize this legal history project.
Thanks also to comments from participants in the 2013 J. Willard Hurst Summer Institute in Legal
History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and the Legal History Colloquium at NYU
School of Law, and to the editorial efforts of the Hastings Race and Poverty Law Journal staff,
particularly Pedro Hernandez, Jr. and Patrick Kirby Madden.
I. See LARRY GARA, THE LIBERTY LINE: THE LEGEND OF THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD
120 (1961).
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captors, compelling those four men back onto the road to answer this new
claim, where they were promptly met with a barricade of "boxes, barrels,
bedsteads, barrels, and tables" and driven across the county line. With a
"turbulent mob" armed with knives and pistols circling their carriage,
Clarke's captors eventually decided to surrender Clarke to a local sheriff,
who would eventually permit Clarke to slip off into the night.2
By the 1890s, Howe's 1878 version of these events, claimed to be
"one of the most important and exciting attempts at slave-catching that ever
occurred" had entered America's historical canon, preserved as a story of
all-white abolitionist solidarity filed under the name of "The Rescue of
Milton Clarke." In reading it today, we are left with a picture of Milton
Clarke living in perpetual flight from the law, a "runaway" that could only
live as a free man by relying on the charity of sympathetic whites rejecting
law's constraints.
As it turned out, Howe's version was not the first time the story had
reached print. Back in 1846, Milton Clarke had published his own version,
piling fact upon fact to argue that his putative master's chain of title had
been destroyed well before he reached the Buckeye State. Archibald Logan,
Clarke maintained, claimed him on the basis of phony documents, relying
upon a series of "shams and forgeries" to cover up the fact that Clarke was
in fact the son of a white Revolutionary War veteran and a woman that was
of no more than a quarter African descent, herself the daughter of a female
slave "perhaps half white." For some newspapers, this effectively made
both Milton and Lewis Clarke - men "with only a sprinkling of the
African; just enough to make them bright, uick, and intelligent, and
scarcely observable in color"-"white slaves." Clarke, however, denied
that he was anyone's slave, black or white. When he immigrated to Ohio in
1841, he was merely ensuring that his labor-time would pass into the hands
of its "true owner"- himself.5
In contrast to Howe's account, where the legal claims of Archibald
Logan were repelled by the force of an all-white crowd, Clarke's version
relished in the legal details of his escape. While Clarke's initial court

2. See EBER D. HOWE, AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND RECOLLECTIONS OF A PIONEER PRINTER 51-

53 (1878) (Rare Books Room, New York Public Library). See also Jean Vacheenas and Betty
Volk, Born in Bondage: History of a Slave Family, NEGRO HISTORY BULLETIN 101 (May 1,

1973).
3. See WILBUR SIEBERT, THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM
370 (1898); Margaret 0. Collacott, The Escape of Milton Clarke, 2 HISTORICAL SOCIETY
QUARTERLY OF LAKE COUNTY, OHIO BULLETIN Nov. 1960, at 1. Siebert gives the date as Sept.

1842.
4. See Lewis Clarke, A White Slave's Experience, SIGNAL OF LIBERTY, Jan. 9, 1843; J.
Thompson, ProgressofFreedom, EMANCIPATOR, Aug. 7, 1844.
5.

See Narrative of Milton Clarke, in NARRATIVE OF THE SUFFERINGS OF LEWIS AND

MILTON CLARKE 84 (1846).
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proceedings took up a single sentence in Howe's version, they took up ten
pages in Clarke's, featuring a lawyer stating Clarke's case as a counterclaim
against Archibald Logan's estate. Paraphrasing Clarke's narrative, a
transcript of the hearing would go like this:
Logan's lawyer first argued that his client had detained Clarke under
Ohio's so-called "Black Laws," permitting out-of-state masters to seize
"persons owing service" found in the Buckeye State.
Clarke's lawyer countered that his client was not a "black man" at all.
He then challenged the other side to produce evidence that Clarke "owed"
any service to Logan. ProduceLogan's "bill" to Clarke, he goaded. If it is
"reasonable," my client will pay it.
Logan's attorneys responded that Clarke was not a "servant" of Logan,
but instead was their client's "goods and chattels."
Clarke's lawyer then attacked this ownership claim, demanding that
the opposition produce evidence of Logan's chain of title, something the
other side struggled to produce.
Clarke's lawyer finished with panache. Flouting Ohio rules restricting
testimony from people of color in open court, he challenged the judge to
treat Clarke like the equivalent of a white man, to hear Clarke's story
directly from his client's lips. Did Milton Clarke owe anything to
Archibald Logan?, the lawyer asked. "No," Clarke would explain. For a
decade of unpaid labor, "the deacon owed me about eight hundred dollars;
I owed him nothing." 6
In Milton Clarke's telling, the lawyer making these arguments had a
name-Salmon P. Chase.7 Within the next half decade, this man would rise
to national prominence, serving first as one of Ohio's members in the U.S.
Senate between 1849 and 1855 (elected again in 1860), then as the
Buckeye State's Governor between 1856 and 1860, and next as Lincoln's
Secretary of the Treasury between 1861 and 1864. He would finish his
career succeeding Roger B. Taney as the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court, a post he would hold until his death in 1873. 8 Yet, in 1843, Chase
was a 35-year-old Cincinnati-based lawyer in private practice, playing his
most famous role of all: America's "Attorney General for Runaway
6. Narrativeof Milton Clarke, supra note 5, at 88-98.
7. Clarke's account also mentioned legal assistance by James H. Paine, a "red-hot
abolitionist." Howe's version does not mention Chase, only mentioning Paine. Because of the
stakes involved from Clarke's perspective, the level of detail in describing the legal proceedings in
comparison with Howe's account, additional evidence that Clarke had come into contact with

Chase earlier in Cincinnati, and the similarity in style of argument Clarke described with
contemporary cases argued by Chase, this Article credits Clarke's version. For earlier potential
contacts between the two men, see J. Milton Clarke, "Story of a White Slave (1900)," in Wilbur
Siebert Collection, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio.
8. See Salmon Portland Chase, in 4 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 27 (1943);
JOHN NIVEN, SALMON P. CHASE: A BIOGRAPHY (1995).
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Slaves." If asked about this nickname at the time, Chase would have
rejected the label.9 By insisting that Logan's representatives produce bills,
deeds, and receipts in support of their claim, "Lawyer Chase" was
representing Milton Clarke in a way that he represented all of his clientswhite or black, rich or poor. By matching the legal assertions of Logan's
attorneys with legal arguments of his own, Chase was merely
accompanying Clarke as he sought to achieve his own economic objectives
in a hostile world.
Between 1831, the year he arrived in Cincinnati from Washington,
D.C. to practice law, and 1849, the year he returned to Washington as a
U.S. Senator, Chase's legal practice became one of the most disruptive
forces on the American legal scene. By the 1830s, Chase had devised a
reading of the U.S. Constitution denying the ability of U.S. slaveholders to
use centralized legal institutions to advocate their property claims on a
nationwide basis. As an organizer and proponent of a series of third parties
that made this reading a central part of their platforms (the Liberty Party in
1842-43, the Free Soil Party in 1848, and the Republican Party in 1855-56),
he pushed his ideas onto the national political stage, eventually forcing one
party, the Whigs, into extinction, and pushing a second, the Democratic
Party, towards defeat in 1860.10 By 1855, two Kentucky slaveholders
would angrily accuse Chase of "widening the breach" between Ohio and its
southern neighbors, perhaps pushing one of them to secession." By 1860,
the future Vice-President of the Confederate States, Alexander Stephens,
would consider Chase to be his most formidable intellectual rival in the
U.S. Congress, parrying every proslavery argument Stephens offered with
an antislavery thrust of his own.' 2
Before his arrival on the national scene, however, Chase's special
power lay in his ability to use existing legal principles, mostly drawn from
everyday commercial law, for emancipatory ends. Starting with equitable
9. Chase attributed the nickname to Kentuckians, who at the time considered it an epithet.
See Letter from Salmon P. Chase to James T. Trowbridge (Mar. 20, 1864) (on file with Salmon P.
Chase Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania [hereinafter "HSP"], Box 14). For his own part,
Chase believed that there were "few cases... in which persons other than slaves themselves, have
had anything to do in prompting or even assisting their original flight." See Letter from Chase to
Trowbridge (Mar. 18, 1864) (on file with Chase Papers, HSP, Box 14).
10. See William Gienapp, THE ORIGINS OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1852-1856, 71-89,

201-210 (1987); Stephen Maizlish, "Ohio and the Rise of Sectional Politics," in THE PURSUIT OF
PUBLIC POWER: POLITICAL CULTURE IN OHIO, 1787-1861, 117-43 (1994); Sean Wilentz,
"Slavery, Antislavery, and Jacksonian Democracy," in THE MARKET REVOLUTION IN AMERICA
202-223 (1996); Jonathan Earle, JACKSONIAN ANTISLAVERY AND THE POLITICS OF FREE SOIL
144-198 (2004); Wilentz, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 673-674 (2005).

11. See Letter from Richard Taylor and Orlando Brown to Chase (Aug. 14, 1855) on file
with the Salmon P. Chase Papers, Library of Congress [hereinafter "LC"], Reel 9).
12. See ALEXANDER STEPHENS, 2 A CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW OF THE LATE WAR BETWEEN

THE STATES 417 (1868).
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demands like Clarke's against Archibald Logan, "Lawyer Chase" would
take the statute-driven equality assumed between trading partners on
western waterfronts to imagine ways that assets could be transferred into
the hands of the most socially marginal members of Ohio River Valley
society. Along the way, he and his clients would challenge preconceived
ideas about property, contracts, and state and federal constitutional law,
bending them towards a more inclusive conception of retributive justice.
Rather than presaging his later political triumphs, Chase's style of
lawyering at the time, only two years removed from service to Cincinnati's
largest bank, was something that many of his attorney peers would have
considered reckless and unorthodox, supposedly guaranteed for defeat.
The full story of Chase's early career as a commercial lawyer,
encompassing but extending beyond his representation of ex-slave clients,
has never received sustained historical attention on its own terms.' 3 When
current legal historians write about the years between the sectional crisis of
the early 1850s and the American Civil War, Chase usually appears in his
later incarnation as a politician, generally as a supporting actor in a larger
drama starring a different business lawyer from the Midwest, Abraham
Lincoln. As Lincoln's Treasury Secretary, Chase may still merit the
distinction that appears in Freedom National, James Oakes' history of
wartime emancipation, as "the most radical member of Lincoln's cabinet.'14
Or he may receive the similar label, recorded in John Witt's Lincoln's
Code, as the "most antislavery member" of Lincoln's team.15 On closer
inspection, however, even these superlatives seem hollow. When Lincoln
signs the final draft of the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863 in Lincoln's
Code, and then adds a coda framing this measure not merely as a matter of
"military necessity" but as an "Act of Justice," this evocative line is
attributed to Lincoln himself, even though the phrase, originally tied to God
and the U.S. Constitution and decoupled from any mention of martial force,
was initially suggested to Lincoln in late 1862 from another source, Salmon

P. Chase.16
The vanishing act that Chase plays in Lincoln's Code is telling. Since
the final demise of Radical Reconstruction during the 1870s, it has become
increasingly difficult for historians to study Chase's reputation as a
"radical," or to identity how precisely his early legal career laid the

13. The one extended account of Chase's early legal career in Cincinnati focuses exclusively
on his antislavery work. See STEPHEN MIDDLETON, OHIO AND THE ANTISLAVERY ACTIVITIES OF
SALMON PORTLAND CHASE, 1830-1849 (1990).
14. See JAMES OAKES, FREEDOM NATIONAL: THE DESTRUCTION OF SLAVERY IN THE

UNITED STATES 1861-1865, at4 (2013).
15. See JOHN FABIAN WITr, LINCOLN'S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY
214 (2013).
16. See 6 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, in COLLECTED WORKS 25-26 (1953).
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groundwork for the Republican coalition, without allowing contemporary
views about the relationship between race and law to determine their
assessment. Thus, in the early 1900s, when white historians began to revise
the history of the Civil War, Chase was placed in a negative light, depicted
as part of "a group of political radicals that plunged the nation into civil
convulsions."'
Years later, writers whose racial consciousness were
framed in terms of the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s examined the
same sources and chose to see Chase as a brilliant political organizer.
Writing in 1970, for instance, Eric Foner presented Chase as a 1850s
version of Tom Hayden, a white antislavery propagandist capable of
convincing Northern whites that a Southern conspiracy was undermining
the freedom of "white men."18
By the late 1970s, however, legal historians focusing more closely on
Chase's reading of the U.S. Constitution, a reading which would largely
leave slavery's constitutional fate to individual states, would categorize
Chase as taking a "moderate" approach compared with those who argued
for immediate abolition. 19 And by the 1990's, the drift from "Chase-theradical" to "Chase-the-moderate" also created space for a third
interpretation-"Chase-the-conservative." In a 1997 review essay, Michael
Les Benedict argued that Chase's chief contribution as a lawyer/politician
was his attempt to use "local institutions"-namely writs for habeas
corpus-"to resist unpopular central policies." This, in turn made Chase a
"strict constructionist" when it came to federal power, actually paving the
way for a form of Constitutional interpretation that lawyers for big business
clients would use to avoid federal oversight during the Gilded Age. For
Benedict, Chase's support of equal political rights for African-Americansa position he concluded most people would now consider "orthodox"-was
the only remaining ground to qualify Chase as a "radical" during his own
20
f
time. Others focusing even more narrowly on Chase's courtroom work
for fugitive slaves, however, have questioned even this characterization by

17. See Arthur Meier Schlesinger, Salmon P. Chase: Undergraduate and Pedagogue, 28
OHIO ARCHEOLOGICAL AND HIST. Q. 119 (1919); See also GEORGE F. MILTON, THE AGE OF
HATE: ANDREW JOHNSON AND THE RADICALS (1930); HARRY T. WILLIAMS, LINCOLN AND THE

RADICALS 294-313 (1941).
18. ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN

PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 73-102 (1970).

See also HANS TREFOUSSE, THE RADICAL

REPUBLICANS: LINCOLN'S VANGUARD FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1968); KENNETH STAMPP, THE ERA

OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877 (1965).
19. See WILLIAM WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 172-227 (1977). See also JAMES MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF
FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 61 (1988); WILLIAM WIECEK AND HAROLD HYMAN, EQUAL
JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875, at 106 (1982).
20. See Michael Les Benedict, Salmon P. Chase and ConstitutionalPolitics, 22 L. & Soc.
INQUIRY 459, 500 (1997).
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arguing that Chase's rejection of immediate abolition may have contained a
latent "apology for slavery." 21
Considering how Chase's later career has been reinterpreted over the
years, it would be understandable for those interested in reexamining Chase
today to ask a simple question: what, if anything, should inspire us to
continue using the "radical"label when it comes to Salmon P. Chase?
By focusing exclusively on Chase's active law office work between
1831 and 1849, this Article suggests that the "radical" label may still indeed
fit.
Rather than using published speeches to elucidate Chase's
Constitutional theories once he reached the national stage, it relies primarily
upon the unpublished law office papers of Chase and his contemporaries
within the Cincinnati bar as it was composed in the 1830s and 1840s,
studying how Chase's increasingly egalitarian legal perspective was shaped
by the transformation of his commercial law practice during this period.
Starting with work for the nation's most hated bank and then extending his
legal interpretations to pariah clients like impoverished waterfront workers,
free Cincinnati blacks, and fugitive slaves, Chase gradually developed an
inclusive style of commercial law thinking that he would maintain with
evangelical fervor, even when some of his ideas trespassed upon cherished
prejudices concerning race and class, prompting some of his colleagues to
consider him mad. By seeing "Lawyer Chase" in the way that private
clients saw him-as a plantiffs' attorney solving business problems-rather
than in the way that he has been remembered by historians-as a quasipublic defender seeking to shape national slavery policy-this Article
endeavors to uncover the qualities that made his style of legal thinking
21. Chase, Stephen Middleton has argued, became involved in the antislavery movement
only as a way to fight the "persecution" of some of his white friends who happened to be
abolitionist themselves, not out of a deep concern about "the condition of black people." See
MIDDLETON, supra note 13, at 7 (1990). Similarly, Nikki Taylor has argued that while Chase
may have been a "powerful ally" of Queen City's free black population, he also harbored a
"racism" that "led him to believe that African-Americans were inferior." See TAYLOR,
FRONTIERS OF FREEDOM: CINCINNATI'S FREE BLACK COMMUNITY, 1802-1868, 113-115 (2005)

For one biographer, this meant when Chase represented black clients, he saw himself playing a
type of "father figure" role, striving to lessen the plight, perhaps self-imposed, of a group he
believed he was especially equipped to help. See FREDERICK BLUE, SALMON P. CHASE: A LIFE IN

POLITICS 34 (1987). Regardless of occasional statements made to white audiences while
lawyering and as a politician seeming to express sympathy for concepts of white superiority,
Chase consistently held that such views, even if personally held, had no proper formal place
within American law, which throughout his career stood for "equal justice" regardless of color or
perceived social position. See, e.g., Speech on the Colored People of Ohio (transcript available at
the Chase Papers, HSP, Box 17). Moreover, Chase's statements could be modified (and openly
debated) when speaking to African-American correspondents. See, e.g., Letter from Chase to
Frederick Douglass (May 5, 1850); Douglass to Chase (May 20, 1850) (on file with the Chase
Papers, University Publications of America [hereinafter "UPA"], Reel 7); Letter from Salmon P.
Chase to Charles Henry Langston and John Mercer Langston (Nov. 11, 1850) (on file with the
Chase Papers, LC, Reel 8).
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become so unusual, and so radical, at the time.
At the heart of Chase's radical side, this Article suggests, was a strain
of utopian egalitarianism, modeled upon the theoretical equality imagined
as existing between trading partners on western waterfronts, relentlessly
denying the power of American legal institutions to honor any distinctions
between litigants based on their actual or perceived positions within society.
At a time when some contemporaries viewed the world as divided into a
series of "patriarchal relations" where "the strong" were entitled by the law
(rightly or wrongly) "to control the weak," Chase's perspective was that of
an outsider, disciplined through nearly two decades of commercial law
services provided to a social pariah clientele. 22 If, as the historian Harold
Hyman has written, "Lawyer Chase" may have sometimes "perceived
blacks as white people with pigmented skins," this was not necessarily an
intellectual vestige of racism for Chase, something that he was burdened
with and "could never overcome."23 Instead, it was a consciously chosen
mindset of liberation, freeing Chase as a white man to clear his mind of his
own prejudices, allowing him to begin dreaming up the legal contours of a
society that existed without any color differences at all.
At the time, Chase's legal practice was indeed radical in the singular
way that it attacked the assumption, best encapsulated in Roger Taney's
Dred Scott opinion in 1857, that caste-like distinctions based on race and
class enjoyed a special place in the history of American law.24 And
retelling the story of Chase's legal practice can still be radical today. Since
Morton Horwitz' Transformation of American Law, for instance, a
dominant narrative within scholarship about the history of American law
has been that everyday private law institutions such as property and contract
largely functioned during the 19th century as the near-perfect weapons of
the economically strong over the weak. 5 The story of Chase's early legal

22. For a clear summation of Chase's opposition to this "patriarchal" interpretation of
American law given during his political career, see Lecture on Slavery, Boston, 1854-1855
(transcript available at Chase Papers, HSP, Box 17). Chase's utopianism is also studied on less
legal terms in Stephen Maizlish, Salmon P. Chase: The Roots of Ambition and the Origins of
Reform, 18 JOURNAL OF THE EARLY AM. REPUBLIC 47 (1998).

23. See HAROLD HYMAN, THE RECONSTRUCTION JUSTICE OF SALMON P. CHASE 168
(1997).
24. Taney's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) is now accepted by legal
scholars as reflecting the "standard" view of white jurisprudence on African-American citizenship
at the time. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW, SIXTH ED. 31-36 (2008);
MARK GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006); AUSTIN
ALLEN, ORIGINS OF THE DRED SCOTT CASE (2006); Gerald Leonard, Law and Politics
Reconsidered: A New ConstitutionalHistory of Dred Scott, 34.3 L. & SOC. INQ. 747 (2009).
25. See, e.g., MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860
(1977); CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN AMERICA, 1815-1846
(1991); Amy Dru Stanley, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT (1998); Seth Rockman, The Unfree
Origins of American Capitalism, in THE ECONOMY OF EARLY AMERICA 335 (Cathy Mason ed.,
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career, where commercial law concepts were turned to liberating ends, turns
this story on its head.26
The story of Chase's law practice in Cincinnati also reveals the private
law dimensions of emancipation, a familiar story usually told in public law
terms. For more than a century, leading scholars have informed readers,
white Americans used legal understandings, backed by public force, to
maintain African-Americans and other minority populations in an
oppressed condition. Only after the Civil War did this situation apparently
change with the Union's "destruction" of slavery as a property regime,
sanctioned by federal law in the form of the Thirteenth Amendment after
the fact. This, in turn, only occurred after a great deal of state-sanctioned
violence, initially exercised on dubious legal grounds. 27 This standard story
throws episodes like Milton Clarke's escape back to the realm of Eber
Howe, turning them into historical footnotes where a few heroes violently
resisted established law in the age of Dred Scott before the Emancipation
Proclamation. Here, with slavery framed as the historical rule and
emancipation as a one-time exception, it becomes easy to imagine a postWar world where slavery is revived, perhaps in the form of a "new Jim
Crow," and nearly impossible to imagine how any form of oppression could
have been lawfully wiped away without the exercise of exceptional force. 2 8
As explained in this Article, Salmon P. Chase's early law office
practice suggested a less violent road to emancipation than such a narrative
would allow, requiring far less heroic-scale law reform to accomplish and
little public administration to maintain, generating fewer human casualties
along the way. Rather than through constitutional amendment or military
force, Chase's road to emancipation relied upon private commercial
initiative and settled Ohio statutory precedent twisted in unexpected

2006); CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND: LAW, LABOR, AND CIVIC IDENTITY IN
COLONIZING ENGLISH AMERICA, 15801865 (2010); BARBARA YOUNG WELKE, LAW AND THE
BORDERS OF BELONGING IN THE LONG NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (2010); WALTER
JOHNSON, RIVER OF DARK DREAMS (2013).

26. As such, this work identifies a way that legality, particularly the peculiar legalities of
property law, can served to mediate and sometimes upend uneven social arrangements, in the
process building broader support for the rule of law itself. Inspiration for this possibility has been
drawn from reading E. P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: ORIGINS OF THE BLACK ACT (1975)

and EDUARDO PEl&ALVER & SONIA KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: How SQUATTERS, PIRATES,
AND PROTESTORS IMPROVE THE LAW OF PROPERTY OWNERSHIP (2010).
27. See, e.g., IRA BERLIN, ET AL., SLAVES No MORE: THREE ESSAYS ON EMANCIPATION
AND THE CIVIL WAR (1992); Ariela Gross, Slavery, Anti-Slavery, and the Coming of the Civil
War, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 280 (Christopher Tomlins & Michael

Grossberg eds., 2008); OAKES, supra note 14.
28. See, e.g., DOUGLAS BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE REENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2008);
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
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directions, eventually framing the freedom of people like Milton Clark in
legal terms as a type of bankruptcy proceeding against an indebted estate.
Perhaps because of the possibility that Chase's style of appropriating
commercial law concepts for emancipatory ends could be used in newer
contexts, it is worth remapping today.2 9
This Article charts Chase's path through four Parts and a Conclusion.
Part I focuses upon Chase's work as the solicitor for the Cincinnati Branch
of the Second Bank of the United States in the 1830s, work that taught
Chase to see property ownership through a capitalist lens while eventually
sparking a moral crisis leading to his first case representing an alleged
fugitive slave. Part II turns to Chase's work in the 1840s after a messy split
with the Bank, studying how he rebuilt his practice by making old creditor
arguments available for a hardscrabble white clientele with a more tenuous
claim to Cincinnati's riches. Part III provides a specific example of his
work in this direction, showing how Chase's interpretation of a new state
statute turned Ohio's boatmen into an insurgent new creditor class,
eventually upsetting settled understandings of property and contract on both
sides of the city's color line. Part IV focuses more directly on how Chase
applied the same principles in his work for clients of color, explaining how
representing black clients in commercial cases informed his efforts to repeal
the state's discriminatory "Black Laws," the first major law reform effort of
his career. Finishing in 1849, the year Chase first entered the U.S. Senate,
the Article's Conclusion sketches how the radically egalitarian
interpretation of Ohio law Chase developed in Cincinnati continued to
influence his career on the national stage.

I. Serving Vultures, Serving God: Chase's Early Debt
Collection Practice and His Moral Awakening
While famous for his cases involving fugitive slaves, the bulk of
Chase's active legal career was spent as a debt collection attorney for white
clientele. Beginning in 1830, this Part explains how his work in the debt
collection field for the Bank of the United States taught him to see the
world from a capitalist's perspective, and how a painful religious
conversion eventually caused him to question his path. This Part ends in
1837 with Chase's first publicized slave case, showing how, even at this
moment, financial pressures forced Chase to align his new outlook within
the confines of his existing commercial law practice.

29. This Article's interpretation of Lawyer Chase's use of formal legal argument as a form
of nonviolent resistance and "regime change" has been influenced by concepts drawn from GENE
SHARP, FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR LIBERATION
(2002).
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A. Chase's "Struggle for Subsistence"
Chase began his career like many of his most famous clients, as an
outsider looking in. Moving in 1830 to the Queen City, a place where he
had been dismissed as an unwanted "yankee" during a brief sojourn in his
teenage years, he would consider himself to be a "stranger and adventurer"
in his adopted hometown. And yet he would try to position himself for
public life, for a time winning a seat on Cincinnati's city council. 30 The
orphaned son of a failed New Hampshire businessman who would pray to
"the God of the Fatherless," he would strive, in contrast, to become a selfsustaining family man himself.3 1 Sliding into and out of debt for critical
periods of his early career, however, he would suffer in his earliest attempts
at respectability.
Chase's early stumbles would be particularly scarring because in 1830,
his success seemed assured. Like most members of the Cincinnati bar he
had come from somewhere else, bearing what a contemporary called "the
New England passport" of a diploma from Dartmouth College while also
having read law for several years with William Wirt, the longtime U.S.
Attorney General.3 2 Required to wait a year before sitting for the Ohio bar,
he had also worked in the law office of Nathaniel Wright, another New
Hampshire product, known to be the city's "soundest and safest" legal
mind.33 In choosing Cincinnati over Baltimore, he had picked a place
where he believed he could soon "be first." 34 But things did not go as
planned, devolving into what one contemporary would call "a struggle for
subsistence . . . without estate or influential friends." 35

30. See Letter from Chase to Trowbridge (Jan. 25, 1864) (on file with the Chase Papers,
HSP, Box 14) (labeled "yankee" during first 1820s stay); Entry for Sept. 30, 1830, in PAPERS,
VOL.

I - JOURNALS,

1829-1872 (hereinafter "CHASE DIARIES") 54 (1993)

("stranger and

adventurer").
31. SALMON P. CHASE, Entry for Sept. 30, 1830, in CHASE DIARIES 54. Chase would marry
three wives in succession, each of whom would die shortly after marriage, leaving him six
daughters, only two of whom would live to adulthood. See James McClure, et. Al., eds.,
Introduction to 'SPUR UP YOUR PEGASUS': FAMILY LETTERS OF SALMON, KATE, AND NETTIE

CHASE, 18441873 (2009).
32. On Chase possessing "the passport of New England," see A. G. W. CARTER, THE OLD
COURT HOUSE: REMINISCENCES AND ANECDOTES OF THE COURTS AND BAR OF CINCINNATI 121

(1880). In 1850, the Hamilton County Clerk recorded 213 members of the Cincinnati bar, only 58
of whom had been born in Ohio. See James Hunter, Roll of Members of the Bar in Hamilton
County (1850) (on file with Misc. Collection, Cincinnati History Library and Archives
[hereinafter "CHLA"]).
33. On Chase's clerkship for Wright, see Letter from Chase to Charles D. Cleveland (Mar.
18, 1830) (on file with Chase Papers, LC, Reel 3). "Soundest and safe" is from CARTER, supra
note 32, at 51.
34. See Letter from Chase to Cleveland (Feb. 3, 1830) (on file with Chase Papers, LC, Reel
3).
35. See EDWARD PIERCE, BIOGRAPHY OF SALMON P. CHASE 8 (on file with Chase Papers,

LC, Reel 32).
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One year in, Chase would write to a friend that he had been "visited by
calamities" in his personal finances, becoming "considerably indebted" to
friends to stay afloat. 36 A year later, he found himself in a law partnership
with Edward King, a man with political ambitions who left most of the
office work to Chase and Timothy Walker, another recent arrival from New
England with supposedly better credentials than Chase. According to the
firm's law clerk at the time, Walker was clearly the more impressive of the
two: while Chase was largely "of literary merit," writing unpublished
articles on non-legal topics in his spare time, the Harvard-trained Walker, a
prot6gde of Joseph Story, was positioned to become a "lion in the west."37
"He is my friend and rival," Chase would admit when describing him.38
"At present we are in cooperation but it cannot always be so."39 Their
partnership would be quickly dissolved, lasting only seven months.40
While the firm still existed, the partnership agreement for "King,
Chase, and Walker" advertised that it was involved in "every kind of
business."41 In practice, its work centered on collecting debts in the West
for Eastern creditors, turning Chase and Walker, in Walker's words, into a
flock of "melancholy vultures." 4 2 Initially, Chase hated it. 43 In settling
debts for distant bankers in Philadelphia and New York, he was serving a
class of people that he described in 1831 as "not being part of society," as
having "amassed fortunes out of the wants of the poor."4 But as an
outsider himself, he seemed to be a natural, especially after he entered a
second partnership with a lawyer named Daniel J. Caswell, the solicitor of
the Cincinnati Branch of the Second Bank of the United States. 45 ,1 Will
take care of the interests of the capitalists in the most faithful manner," he

36. See Letter from Chase to Hamilton Smith (Mar. 12, 1832) (on file with Salmon P. Chase
Papers, UPA, Reel 4).
37. See Isaac A. Jewett, 'CincinnatiIs a Delightful Place':Letters of a Law Clerk, 10 BULL.
OF THE HIST. AND PHIL. SOC. OF OHIO 256 (Oct. 1952). On Walker, see CLARA LONGWORTH
CHAMBRUN, THE MAKING OF NICHOLAS LONGWORTH 5570 (1935).

38. See Letter from Chase to Smith (May 29, 1832) (on file with Chase Papers, UPA, Reel
4).
39. Id.

40. See Letter from Chase to Smith (Nov. 14, 1832) (on file with Chase Papers, UPA, Reel
4).

41. See Partner Agreement for "King, Chase, and Walker" (Apr. 10, 1832) (on file with
Chase Papers, LC, Reel 32).
42. See Letter from Timothy Walker to Salmon P. Chase (on file with Chase Papers, HSP,
Box 12).
43. Early on, even when his desk was full, Chase's letters back to New Hampshire would
describe a growing "detestation and abhorrence of the law business." See Letter from Chase to
Cleveland (Aug. 13, 1832) (on file with Chase Papers, HSP, Reel 4).
44. See Letter from Chase to Cleveland (Dec. 21, 1831) (on file with Chase Papers, HSP,
Box 13).
45. See SALMON P. CHASE, Entry for Nov. 1, 1832, in CHASE DIARIES 67.
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wrote to a friend shortly after joining with Caswell. 46 "Caswell & Chase"
would provide full-scale financial services, helping out-of-state clients
invest in Cincinnati businesses, promising them up to a 15% return,
collecting their Ohio bills if they went unpaid.47
In serving the city's capitalists, Chase would become a debt-collecting
business man himself, an identity that he would carry with him throughout
his active legal career and that he would assign to even his most
impoverished clients in their own "struggles for subsistence" a few years
later.
B. "The Bank is at Liberty"
As a debt collection attorney, Chase learned how to place the full force
of Ohio law at a client's back. Compared to its southern neighbor of
Kentucky, where a political movement for "debtor relief' had once led the
state legislature to create a tribunal blocking creditor claims, 4 8 a new Ohio
law passed in Chase's first year titled an "Act Regulating Judgments and
Executions," allowed creditors to seize a debtor's "land, tenements, goods
and chattels" as a form of alternative cash payment. Following procedures
that had been used by colonial British investors to collect American debts
during the Colonial era, a creditor's attorney could appear before a local
justice of the peace with a writ of scirefacies to obtain a judgment that a
debt was due, which in turn allowed a writ of execution to be levied, first on
the debtor's moveable property, then on their land.49 When initially passed,
some Cincinnati lawyers would have seen this as directly benefiting the
city's local traders, small-scale creditors who bought and sold goods on
consignment. Writing in the Western Tiller, a Jacksonian newspaper
published in the late 1820s, one Cincinnati lawyer named James Gazlay had
criticized the way that Ohio lawyers had used "arbitrary" pleading defects
to keep a "just claim" from being paid, reducing small businessmen to
"poverty, want, and finally death." The 1831 statute, which replaced
competing "forms, precedents, and endless theory" with a summary
hearing, a quick judgment, and an even quicker execution, would have been
a laudable reform. 50
46. See Letter from Chase to Hamilton Smith (Nov. 14, 1832) (on file with Chase Papers,
UPA, Reel 4).
47. Id.
48. See JAMES A. RAMAGE & ANDREA S. WATKINS, KENTUCKY RISING 87-90 (2011); 2
CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT INUNITED STATES HISTORY 93-111 (1922).
49. See Salmon P. Chase, 3 STATUTES OF OHIO AND OF THE NORTHWESTERN TERRITORY
1709-1711 (1835). Earlier colonial British analogues are discussed in Claire Priest, "Creating an
American Property Law: Alienability and Its Limits in American History," 120.2 HARVARD L.
REV. 385-459 (2006).
50. See James Gazlay, Justice No. II, WESTERN TILLER (Sept. 1, 1826); Justice No. XV,
WESTERN TILLER (Dec. 22 1826). On Gazlay, see DANIEL AARON, CINCINNATI, QUEEN CITY OF
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By 1833, however, with Caswell directing Chase to file writs of scire
facies for the benefit of the city's largest banking institution, 5 the
Judgments and Executions Act was being put to use for a very different
kind of client, one which Democrats like Gazlay and many of their clients
reviled. Chase's association with Caswell in late 1832 had in fact begun at
the height of Andrew Jackson's war with the Second Bank of the United
States, the firm's main client and the entity that Jackson called the "Monster
Bank." Although it served as Cincinnati's main conduit for credit and
capital from the East, the Bank had become a target of Jacksonian vitriol
within the Queen City. Ten years earlier, in fact, state legislators had
enacted a law purporting to render an earlier version of the Bank an
"outlaw" under state law. Although this act was overturned by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1824, the political critique that it contained remained
viable through the 1830s. 52 The Cincinnati Branch, Charles Larabee, the
city's customs surveyor (appointed by Jackson) would write in 1834, was a
"stranger" to Cincinnati, representing outside creditors carrying off "some
thirty millions of ... property" from the Queen City, leaving town residents
in "no better condition in the world than as poor debtors and slaves." 53
By 1834, when Larabee leveled this accusation, Daniel Caswell had
decided to depart for Indiana, agreeing to leave Chase with all of the new
business of the Bank's Cincinnati Branch.5 4 By this point, the lawyer
responsible for representing an entity accused of the fiscal "enslavement" of
all of Cincinnati became none other than Chase, America's future "attorney
general for runaway slaves." High-minded defenses of the social benefits
of Chase's work were available, with Timothy Walker at various points

THE WEST, 1819-1838, at65 (1992).

51. See Letter from Daniel Caswell to Chase, (Aug. 7, 1833) (on file with Chase Papers,
UPA, Reel 4).
52. See, e.g., CHARLES C. HUNTINGTON, A HISTORY OF BANKING AND CURRENCY IN OHIO
BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 98-99 (1910); STEPHEN MAIZLISH, THE TRIUMPH OF SECTIONALISM:

THE TRANSFORMATION OF OHIO POLITICS, 1844-1856, at 1-44 (1982).

53. See Letter from Charles Larabee to Robert Lytle (Aug. 25, 1834) (on file with Lytle
Family Papers, CHLA). Larabee had previously protested Treasury Department orders to deposit
customs returns in the Second Bank of the United States. See Letter from A. Dickins to Larabee
(July 13, 1831) ( On file with Records of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Correspondence of
the Secretary of the Treasury with Collectors of Customs, Record Group 56, MI 78, Reel 34,
National Archives and Records Administration). Larabee's view was increasingly controlling
public opinion within Cincinnati and Ohio at large, with Robert Lytle, the recipient of his letter
and Cincinnati's member in the U.S. House of Representatives, approving Jackson's decision to
veto the renewal of the bank charter in 1832, and with a "No-Bank" wing of the state's
Democratic party rising to power by 1836, vowing to oppose the creation of any newly chartered
banks on the state level. See Reginald C. McGrane, OratorBob and the Right of Instruction, 11
BULL. OF THE HIST. AND PHIL. SOC. OF OH. 250-73 (1953).
54. See Memorandum for Mr. Caswell (ca. 1834); Dissolution Agreement between Chase
and Caswell (Jan. 25, 1834) (on file with Chase Papers LC).
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suggesting that rigorous debt collection on behalf of such clients helped
people live up to the "moral obligation" of their contracts while also
keeping property in the hands of the most "productive" users.55 But even
Timothy Walker expressed concern for how "the venerable forms of
pleading" were generally discarded under the 1831 "Judgments and
Executions" Act, leading to "vexatious" proceedings that were the
equivalent of "petty tyranny."5 6 Chase, in contrast, did not share Walker's
concern. Instead, he preferred to see his debt collection work on more
personal terms, as a struggle to defend the interests of individual lawabiding clients facing unlawful attacks on their right to belong.
For Chase, collecting the Bank's debts became a matter of honor.
Back in 1831 while he was still short of clients, he had agreed to
consolidate all of the state's statutes into a three-volume work that he called
The Statutes of Ohio, a work placing on-the-books laws like the 1831
statute concerning "Judgments and Executions" alongside the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787 and the U.S. Constitution. By the time his last volume
appeared in 1835, Chase would be able append court decisions he had
obtained on behalf of the Bank. 7 As the author of the book on Ohio
statutory law, attacks on statutes like the 1831 "Judgments and Executions"
law became not only an attack on Chase's main client, but an attack upon
Chase himself.
Thus, as early as 1833, Chase would liken lawyers for the state's
debtors, supposedly subverting Ohio's statutory scheme through common
law objections and sham mortgages to third parties, to a many-headed
"Hydra" that other lawyers had been unable to kill. Chase attempted to
slay this demon by focusing upon an expansive reading of the Bank's
federal charter and of state law. As Branch Solicitor between 1834 and
1841, he would generate legal opinions that would assert that the 1831
"Judgments and Execution" statute turned all debt judgments into "liens"
against debtor real estate, supposedly superior to any other claim.
Moreover, "[h]aving the legal, title and the right to the possession," he
would counsel, "the Bank was at liberty to take possession at any time and
in any way." 59 As such, Chase's reading went beyond the language of the
1831 statute, which did not directly state that creditor claims were the
equivalent of liens. He also went beyond the traditional understanding of

55. See Timothy Walker, Annual Discourse: Delivered before the Ohio Hist. and Phil. Soc.
15-16 (1838); Walker, Mercantile Library Lectures (1841) (transcripts available in Timothy
Walker Papers, CHLA, Box 2, Book 2).
56. See Walker, Letters from Ohio-No. II, NEW-ENGLAND MAGAZINE, Nov. 1831 at 381.
57. See CHASE supra note 47.
58. See SALMON P. CHASE, Entry for Jan. 21, 1833, in CHASE DIARIES 69.
59. See, e.g., Letters from Chase to Herman Cope (Jan. 19, 1835; Feb. 6, 1835) (on file with
Timothy Kirby Papers, CHLA, Box 13).
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what a "lien" involved, a legal interest that would typically expire unless
being immediately acted upon. And by arguing that the Bank gained an
interest over real estate that it did not yet posses, and could seize it at a later
point and sell it at a profit, he also went beyond the text of the Bank's own
federal charter, which arguably did not grant the institution these
authorities.
Chase's legal opinions shifted the Bank's economic posture from an
institution facing liquidation into a going business concern, in turn securing
his place as one of Cincinnati's leading commercial lawyers. By late 1834,
he was the lead attorney for seventeen suits executing judgments on debtor
property in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas on behalf of the
Bank, as well as twenty-three suits that the Bank had brought to foreclose
mortgaged property through actions in "ejectment" brought in the same
court under chancery rules. 60 At the same time, he had been hired as the
solicitor for the city's Lafayette Bank, also sitting on its board of
directors. 6 1 A few years later, he was handling multiple accounts for
Nicholas Longworth, Cincinnati's single largest private buyer, seller, and
mortgagor of real estate. 6 2 By this point, 90% of the city's wealth in terms
of real property was held by six individuals, two of whom (the Bank and
Longworth) were represented by Salmon P. Chase.
C. Tragedy and New Conviction
Despite his success, something seemed morally amiss. Dining with an
agent for the Bank on a Sunday in 1833, he let the conversation turn to his
work for their mutual employer, later regretting the decision to speak on
such "worldly and frivolous" topics on the Sabbath.64 By late 1835, his
banking work had become so central to his life that he convinced himself
that it would be in his family's interest to take a business trip to
Philadelphia for the Lafayette Bank shortly after his first wife gave birth to
their first child. On his way back home, he learned that his wife, weakened
by the birth, had died. Tragically, his infant daughter quickly followed her
to the grave. Diary entries for these months indicate that Chase partly
blamed himself for these deaths, asking whether it had been God's

60. See S. P. Chase Solicitor's Report (Oct. 27, 1834) (on file with Kirby Papers, CHLA,
Box 13).
61. See Entry for Nov. 12-22, 1835 in CHASE DIARIES 80. Chase would similarly seek to

alter the Lafayette Bank's charter to allow it to acquire stock as well as land as collateral, taking a
hand in investing some of the institution's assets himself. See Entries for Feb. 8, 1835, and Nov.
22, 1848,
62.
63.
64.

in CHASE DIARIES 112, 197.
See Letter from Chase to Nicholas Longworth, (1840 ), in Reel 5, Chase Papers,UPA
See Walter Stix Glazer, CINCINNATI IN 1840,87 (1999).
See Entry for May 5, 1833, in CHASE DIARIES 74.
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punishment for placing too much emphasis on his "worldly" pursuits.65 By
1836, this question seemed to drive to him to scripture and a new
commitment to a Christian faith he had inherited, prompting a
reexamination of his own life. Within a few years, it would inspire him to
study and memorize Psalm 119,66 the longest chapter in the Old Testament.
"Turn my heart towards your statutes and not toward selfish gain," the
Psalmist would implore, addressing God on a personal basis. "Though the
wicked bind me with ropes, I will not forget your law." 6 7
There was a tension in Chase's turn to Psalm 119: it seemed to instruct
Chase to use one form of law (God's) to combat the wickedness that he
encountered in a world partly created by the "worldly" Ohio law he
practiced. In theory, this could have inspired Chase to turn from his
Cincinnati law practice altogether and to take up the life that his uncle, a
famous Episcopal bishop, had pursued.68 It could have also immediately
inspired him to convert his legal expertise into a life of pro bono public
service like Britain's William Wilberforce, whose biography had prompted
Chase to study Psalm 119,69 and who had dedicated a life in Parliament to
moral causes such as abolition following his own religious awakening. But
neither choice seemed to be a viable option for Chase, who would need to
rely upon his private law practice to stay afloat well into the 1840s. "How
his example shames me!" Chase would write when contemplating
Wilberforce.
"Our circumstances so different-He so easy in his
circumstances-I comparatively poor and indebted, and obliged, besides
public duties, to continue my profession."7 0 He would spend the rest of the
1830s and 1840s striving to follow Wilberforce's example within the
confines of his own commercial law practice, seeking to align the more
"worldly" law of property seizures and estate foreclosures he practiced with
higher Christian ideals.
This project took its tentative first steps in the middle of 1836-the
year, Chase would later write, he first "professed faith in Christ."7 That
summer, Isaac Colby, Chase's brother-in-law and a member of Cincinnati's
Anti-Slavery Society, was threatened by a crowd seeking to drive James G.
Birney, Colby's friend (and like Chase, a recent arrival to Cincinnati) out of
town. Birney had recently moved to the Queen City to publish the
Philanthropist,an abolitionist newspaper partly funded by Lewis Tappan, a

65. See, e.g., Diary entries for Nov. 1835-Feb. 1836 in CHASE DIARIES 81-116.
66. See, e.g., Entries for May 27 and May 30, 1840 in CHASE DIARIES 124-6.
67. I19 Psalms 36, 61.
68. See PHILANDER CHASE, 1-2 BISHOP'S CHASE'S REMINISCENCES (1848).

69. See Entry for June 29, 1840, in CHASE DIARIES 130-131.
70. Entry for April 22, 1840, in CHASE DIARIES 210.
71. Entry for April 7, 1847, in CHASE DIARIES 190.
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New York City financier and leading anti-slavery activist.7 2 The attack on
Colby and Birney was apparently supported by some of the town's
storekeepers who worried that the newspaper, like the Bank of the United
States, would negatively impact the city's economy, particularly by
alienating the city's "Southern trade."7 3
Other leading Whig attorneys in Cincinnati attempted to mediate the
Birney dispute, with Timothy Walker serving as the secretary for an "AntiAbolition Meeting" that attempted to persuade Birney to leave Cincinnati.74
Chase took a different approach, standing in Birney's doorway and shouting
down a crowd that had come to sack Birney's residence. Later, he would
draft a resolution condemning the "mob violence" of the anti-Birney crowd
while also bringing a trespass action seeking money damages from
prominent Democrats, allegedly "the leaders of the mob," on behalf of the
Philanthropist'sprinter after that newspaper's press was destroyed.7 5 By
1837, Chase was also defending Matilda Lawrence, an "octoroon" woman
working in Birney's home that had walked away from a lifetime of service
to her biological father (a Missouri slaveholder).
Moreover, he was
representing Birney himself, now a defendant in an action litigated by the
city's Democratic prosecuting attorney brought to collect a fine under an
1807 law making it unlawful to "harbor or conceal" a slave in one's
household.77
For Chase, defending Birney and Matilda Lawrence and bringing an
action on behalf of the printer of the Philanthropisthad several meanings.
First, these initiatives allowed Chase to aid friends of his family through his
work as a lawyer, perhaps absolving his residual guilt linking his practice
of law to the loss of his wife and daughter. Second, the work was
consistent with the abstract disdain he had had expressed early in his career
regarding slavery even before his religious awakening, having drafted a
petition for "gradual abolition" while still living in Washington, D.C. in
1828,78 and having written an article in 1831 on Britain's current Lord
Chancellor, who Chase had lauded for having "denied utterly the

72. For Chase's recollection of the events, see Chase, "Autobiographical Sketch" (Reel 32,
Chase Papers, LC). The relationship between Birney and Tappan is discussed in BERTRAM
WYATT-BROWN, LEWIS TAPPAN AND THE EVANGELICAL WAR AGAINST SLAVERY 133-134
(1969).
73. See NARRATIVE OF THE LATE RIOTOUS PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE LIBERTY OF THE

PRESS INCINCINNATI 43 (1836).
74. See Id. at 25. See also AARON, CINCINNATI, QUEEN CITY 311 (1992).

75. See Letter from Chase to Charles D. Cleveland, Feb. 17, 1837 (Box 13, Chase Papers,
HSP).
76. See WILLIAM BIRNEY, JAMES G. BIRNEY AND HIS TIMES 261-266 (1890).
77. See Birney v. Ohio, 8 Ohio 230 (1837).

78. See Chase, Autobiographical Sketch, July 10, 1853 (Reel 8, Chase Papers, LC).
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fundamental principle ... that man may be the subject of property."79
Third, by taking aim at a Democratic "mob" and Democratic leaders who
he accused of indicting Birney on "political" grounds, it was a continuation
of his body of legal work for the Bank of the United States.s0 As early as
1831, Chase was demonstrating what would come to be identified as antiJacksonian, "Whig" ideals, having confided to Alexis de Tocqueville that
residents of the Queen City had taken "democracy . .. to its ultimate
limits," electing people guilty of "mixing with the mob," rather than
allowing "men of talent"- men presumably like himself-to govern.
D. Ruining a Career?
With Birney, Matilda Lawrence, and the Philanthropist'sprinter as
new clients, Chase could begin to place his legal practice on a clearer moral
footing. Here was an opportunity to use his expertise to follow the path of
the Psalmist, confronting Democratic rulers and the "wicked of the earth"
supposedly seeking to toss aside God's law "like dross." He could do this
while not discarding his primary identity as a business lawyer, charging
fees for his representation of the Philanthropist'sprinter, 82 and by 1837
acquiring new debt collection work by serving as Lewis Tappan's lawyer in
the Cincinnati market, a connection he gained through Birney.83 Chase
even demonstrated that his style of legal interpretation would remain intact.
In the early 1830s, Chase would use Ohio's 1831 "Judgment and
Execution" law, read in tandem with powers said to lurk within an expiring
charter, to transform the hated Second Bank of the United States into an
ongoing real estate concern. By 1837, he was deploying the Declaration of
Independence's "created equal" language, the U.S. Constitution's lack of
textual reference to a "right of property in man," and the Northwest
Ordinance's language purporting to bar "slavery" and "involuntary
servitude" north of the Ohio River, to argue that an alleged fugitive slave,
another "stranger" to the city, had acquired "a legal right to freedom" the
moment she entered the Buckeye State. 84
The moral realignment of Chase's law practice, however, was not yet
79. See Chase, "Life and Character of Henry Brougham," 33.72 NORTH AM. REV. 254 (July
1, 1831).
80. See Chase to Cleveland, Feb. 17, 1837 (the anti-Birney group as a "mob") (Box 13,
Chase Papers, HSP); "From the Cincinnati Gazette, dated April 5, 1837" (Box 19, Chase Papers,
HSP) (labeling the suit vs. Birney as "political").
81.

See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, JOURNEY TO AMERICA 92-93 (1960) (recording notes for

Tocqueville for interview with Chase).
82. See Letter from A. Pugh to Chase, May 19, 1840 (Reel 4, Chase Papers, LC).
83. See Letter from Lewis Tappan to Chase, Oct. 7, 1837 (Reel 3, Chase Papers, LC); Letter
from Birney to Tappan, Aug. 23, 1837 I LETTERS OF JAMES G. BIRNEY 417-419 (1938).
84. See Chase, SPEECH OF SALMON P. CHASE, IN THE COLORED WOMAN, MATILDA (1838)
(hereinafter "LAWRENCE ARGUMENT").
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complete. When he appeared on Lawrence's behalf for the first time, he
would later recall, he would in fact hear one prominent lawyer whisper that
he was a "promising young man" who was on the verge of "ruining his
career." 86 The representation of Lawrence grated against some of the
procedures that Chase had used to become a successful business lawyer. In
his courtroom speech for Lawrence, for instance, Chase had argued that one
of the chief features rendering state and federal "fugitive slave" legislation
unconstitutional was the lack of opportunity provided for people being
claimed as someone else's property to challenge their alleged status in
court. The federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, he would illustrate,
"anticipates no regular suit-no formal trial-no continuance-no delay,"
making it "subversive of the fundamental principle on which all civil
society rests." "Let each man be authorized to reclaim property, and
enforce rights, in this summary way. How long would society hold together
if this principle were carried into general application?" 87
When Chase made this argument in 1837, his audience did not need to
imagine what such a world would look like. Through his work for the
Bank, a client that he would retain for slightly more than three more years,
Chase had interpreted the summary procedures of Ohio's 1831 "Judgments
and Execution" law in precisely the way he was now labeling as
unconstitutional, helping to bring such a statute-driven commercial world based upon court-ordered property transfers stripped of common law
procedural objections - into being. How would the summary processes
that he had been refining for the Bank interact with the new "personal
liberty law" that his representation of Birney and Matilda Lawrence had
inspired him to practice? As of 1837, with both Matilda Lawrence and the
Second Bank of the United States as clients, the answer was not clear.

H1. Building Hardscrabble Hall: Losing the Bank, Gaining a
Working Class Practice
Four years after his representation of Matilda Lawrence, Chase's law
practice was transformed when a fee dispute led to Chase severing ties with
the Second Bank of the United States in 1841. Focusing on events from
this watershed year, this Part explains how Chase rebuilt his practice around
the more tenuous segments of Cincinnati's steamboat economy while
detailing how radical working class arguments eventually made their way
into the everyday debt collection law he would continue to practice.
85. Other historians have assumed that Chase's antislavery legal theory arrived, fully formed
with any subsequent changes, in his Lawrence argument. See, e.g., FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE
LABOR 74-5; OAKES, FREEDOM NATIONAL 15-18
86. See Chase, "Autobiographical Sketch" (Reel 32, Chase Papers, LC).
87. See LAWRENCE ARGUMENT 27.
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A. From Property to Service
Representing Matilda Lawrence threatened to turn Salmon P. Chase
into a new kind of lawyer. In 1836, Chase had written an editorial to the
Cincinnati Gazette, the city's leading Whig newspaper, that the movement
against James G. Birney could be categorized as a lawless "mob" precisely
because of that way that it threatened Birney's property and physical liberty
without any legal process.
After defending Lawrence one year later,
Charles Hammond, the editor of the Gazette, accused Chase of the same
crime. Chase, Hammond would write, was part of a small group of legal
men who were "partially demented" in their understanding of "the legal
rights and obligations created by our Constitution and laws concerning
blacks and mulatto persons." In Ohio, Hammond explained, a process
existed on the statute books whereby any "black or mulatto" person could,
upon adequate proof, be returned to people who claimed them as their
"property" under their own state's laws. By complicating this process,
Chase was suggesting that Birney could willfully subvert the law not only
of Ohio, but of "the United States, where an absolute property in a human
being is recognized by the fundamental laws as a right to be acquired by
one individual over another." 89
While gathering up and redistributing other people's possessions for
clients like the Bank of the United States, Chase had identified weaknesses
and procedural blind spots in "absolute property rights" arguments like
Hammond's. By the time he represented Matilda Lawrence in 1837, the
type of legal regime that Hammond was describing, with property rights
that were clearly defined, protected, and enforced by individual owners on
an exclusive basis while only being transferrable upon an owner's free prior
consent, was something that did not readily exist in the legal world that
Chase had helped to create. Nevertheless, as seen in the "violence against
property" language that Chase used when criticizing the anti-Bimey
movement, "absolute property" seemed to live on in the rhetoric of the
town's Whig business lawyers.90 Accepting Hammond's charge-i.e., that
Chase's arguments for Lawrence performed "violence against property" of
its own - would be like asking to be excommunicated from this group.
This was something that Chase, who would serve as a Whig on Cincinnati's
town council until 1841, was not ready to do.
Instead, when defending his work for Matilda Lawrence, Chase
attempted to shift the terms of the debate. Despite Hammond's assertion,
the text of the U.S. Constitution did not in fact explicitly recognize a right

88. See "From the Cincinnati Gazette, Aug. I1, 1836" (Reel 3, Chase Papers, LC).
89. See "From the Cincinnati Gazette, dated April 5, 1837" (Box 19, Chase Papers, HSP).
90. On Whig defenses of "secure" property during this era, see Daniel T. Rodgers,
CONTESTED TRUTHS 120-130 (1982).
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of "property in man," and never specifically discussed "escaping negroes
and servants." 9 1 Instead, when describing people in Lawrence's position, it
used the term "persons held to service," a designation which Chase argued
could also apply "equally . .. to escaping white apprentices." For Chase,
this turned Lawrence's case from one about "the relation of owner and
property" to one about "the relation of master and servant," something that
made a "palpable difference." 92 While Hammond argued that the color of
Lawrence (later called an "octoroon" by James G. Birney's son)
presumptively marked her as "property," Chase summoned a different body
of law to create support for the principle he maintained elsewhere in his
Matilda argument that under Ohio law, "color affords no presumption
against anybody." 93 Seen as someone merely "owing service," Chase
would have Lawrence judged using the same laws applicable to
employment relations between whites. If she ran away, she could not be
compelled to return. At most, her alleged master would be able to maintain
a common law claim against her, or Bimey, for a "loss of services." 94
If Chase's argument offended Hammond in the way that it replaced a
legal interpretation that would presumptively link the condition of having
dark skin to being a "slave" with a discourse about non-compulsory
"service," it also created the possibility that conservative legal minds within
the city could see James Birney, his other controversial new client, as
worthy of their understanding and respect. In 1830s Cincinnati, it was not
uncommon for elite Cincinnati families to do what Birney's family was
accused of doing, i.e., of employing people of color with contested statuses
within their households. Nicholas Longworth, for instance, would openly
employ an ex-runaway slave in his home for a number of years.9 s Like
Longworth, Birney was a former lawyer and had a long history of managing
servants like Matilda Lawrence in his home, having lived for decades as
slaveholding plantation owner in Alabama, where he was claimed to have
been a "humane master." 96
Representing the interests of Birney and Lawrence, Chase seemed to
be saying, did not upset the city's social order. The relationship between
the "master" Birney and his "servant" Lawrence may have been different

91. See "From the Cincinnati Gazette, dated April 5, 1837," supra note 87.
92. See LAWRENCE ARGUMENT 34; "From the Cincinnati Gazette, dated April 5, 1837,"
supra note 87 ("palpable difference").
93. See LAWRENCE ARGUMENT 11.

94. Id at 30. In the late half of the 1840s, Chase would repeat this argument in a suit
brought against a white man accused for aiding the escape of several alleged slaves. See Notes on
Brief for Jones v. Van Zandt (Reel 14, John McLean Papers, LC).
95. See, e.g., CLARA CHAMBRUN, THE MAKING OF NICHOLAS LONGWORTH 33-35 (1935).
96. See Letter from James G. Birney to Col. Stone, May 2, 1836, in JAMES G. BIRNEY AND
HIS TIMES 423-430.
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from the relationship between "owner" and "absolute property," but it still
featured a leveraged Whig-like distribution of power between governor and
governed. In his argument in Lawrence's case, Chase dwelled on the
perceived powerlessness of Lawrence, described as a "helpless and almost
friendless woman."97 Hammond, meanwhile, had noted Birney's elevated
social status, describing him as a "man of property, character, and
intelligence." 98 Removing slavery and race from the discussion, Chase's
turn to the relationship between "master" and "servant" replaced slavery
with another form of dependent relationship familiar to those who believed,
as Chase did as late as 1831, that only a select number of "men of talent"
were entitled to manage Cincinnati in the enlightened way that Birney
supposedly managed his household.
B. Equal Justice in a Runaway Economy
The utility of Chase's master/servant pivot was short-lived. While
fellow Whigs Charles Hammond and Salmon P. Chase debated the
Lawrence case in the pages of the Cincinnati Gazette during the late 1830s,
the city was changing around them, with a growing wage-earning class
equipped with the noncompulsory understanding of service mentioned in
Chase's Matilda argument blurring the lines of power between master and
servant. Of the 14,544 people with recorded occupations in Cincinnati's
1840 federal census return, only 377, or less than 3%, fell into the collegeeducated professional class of lawyers, physicians, and clergymen that men
like Longworth, Timothy Walker, Hammond, Birney, and Chase all
occupied, the group owning the most valuable property and most likely to
employ a servant in their home. 99 By 1860, only 17% of African-American
women with listed occupations would identify themselves as servants, with
a segment of this group now working as riverboat maids.' 00
In choosing to "follow the river," Matilda Lawrence's successors were
exiting white households and entering an alternate universe that one local
writer would document in 1841 as being occupied by "fruterers, pedlars,
river traders," dry-goods merchants, steamboat builders, boilermakers,
caulkers, engineers, painters, founders, gilders, and glass-fitters.'0 ' Rather
than a paternalistic regime of "domestic service," this was a wage-earning
economy literally founded by people that Chase would call "fugitives from
service." James Howard, for instance, head of the Ohio River's most
97. See "From the Cincinnati Gazette, dated April 5, 1837," supra note 87.
98. Id.
99.

See WALTER STIx GLAZER, CINCINNATI IN 1840: THE SOCIAL AND FUNCTIONAL

ORGANIZATION OF AN URBAN COMMUNITY DURING THE PRE-CIVIL WAR PERIOD 79-122
(1999).
100. See NIKKI TAYLOR, FRONTIERS OF FREEDOM 209 (2005).

101. See CHARLES CISt, CINCINNATI IN 1841 42-43 (1841).
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prolific steamboat-building family, had walked away from an
apprenticeship to a Cincinnati boat builder two years before his term had
ended, financing the construction of his first vessel in 1833 at age 20.102
Starting with little capital except their labor, former Queen City servants
like Howard had turned themselves into people of property and some
standing. As early as 1831, Timothy Walker had reported to Alexis de
Tocqueville that "every year, a crowd of workmen, proletarians from other
States," were moving to Ohio seeking similar opportunities, turning to the
waterfront as a way to earn enough "to buy lands and become
landowners."' 0 3
By the end of the 1830s, the mass experience of converting river labor
into property on land was transforming politics within the Buckeye State,
empowering Ohio wage-earners to see themselves on an equal level as their
employers. What was needed, members of this insurgent group seemed to
believe, was not an end to the commercial system as a whole, but what
Josiah Warren, a Queen City typesetter who sampled and then rejected
experiments in communitarian living further downstream, called "equitable
commerce." As first outlined in the pages of the Western Tiller in the
1820s and fully elucidated in an 1842 book, Warren advocated what he
called the "Equal Exchange System"-a process founded upon a concept of
"equal justice," where goods, services, and property were traded between
individuals "upon equal terms" based on the "labor cost" of each item. This
system, which Warren successfully implemented on a private voluntary
basis for a time, was essentially an application of what property law
scholars would call a Lockean "labor theory of appropriation," wherein
every person was assigned a property right in the "Labour of his Body and
the Work of his Hands." It was a type of working class capitalism attractive
to a group of people seeing themselves as an aspiring class of

entrepreneurs. 10 4
By 1841, people supporting "equal justice" concepts and initiatives,
unburdened by any property restrictions on the franchise and voting largely

102. See, e.g., "Howard's Shipyard," Marine Journal (June 19, 1886) in "Printed Materials"
Box, Howard Shipyards and Dock Co. Papers, Lilly Library, Indiana University-Bloomington.
Similarly, John Armstrong, captain of the leading line of steamers running between Cincinnati and
Louisville, several of which he partly owned, had started his professional life running away from
life as a "bound boy," first to a cabinet maker and then a farmer, before arriving in Cincinnati in
1811 and eventually turning to a life of "work on the river." See "Late Capt. John Armstrong"
and "Life and Death of Capt. Armstrong" in E.P. Anshutz Scrapbook, Inland Rivers Collection,
Public Library of Cincinnati and Hamilton County.
103. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, JOURNEY TO AMERICA 91 (1960).
104. See JOSIAH WARREN, EQUITABLE COMMERCE (1846); Warren, "Explanation of the

Time System, or the Equal Exchange of Labor," WESTERN TILLER (Sept. 12, 1828). For Lockean
labor-property appropriation theory, see GREGORY ALEXANDER & EDUARDO PERALVER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY 39-41 (2012).
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Democratic, had gained control of Ohio's lawmaking process and were
electing representatives seeking to turn Warren's theory into practice. At
the same time that Equitable Commerce appeared in book form, a group of
Cincinnati artisans formed a "Working Men's Association" to protest the
social reform model apparently championed by the city's Whig leadership,
which supposedly placed the common working man's rights "upon an apex
of wealth instead of its base." Burned by bad law, this group resolved to
place "working men" in state and local office - "men who will legislate
for the true interests of those who placed them there." 0 5 Supporters of
these views would single out the usual target of Democratic frustration, the
community's banks. Some adherents would organize targeted runs on
individual institutions, acting, in the words of one biographer of a bank
founder, with "an infinite longing for an opportunity to appropriate."' 06 The
sentiments would also spill over into Ohio's "Anti-Bank election" of 1841,
leading to the appointment of a slate of politicians who refused to renew
any state banking charter. By 1842, when some Cincinnati banks began to
fail, a crowd of what a Democratic newspaper called "law-abiding"
mechanics, artisans, and river workers that had "been swindled out of
[their] hard earnings" swooped in for the kill, looting one of the city's
financial institutions as a way to demand "dues and satisfaction" against
bank officers that had supposedly neglected their public duties by following
advice from lawyers like Salmon P. Chase.10 7
C. The Break from the Bank
These changes transformed Chase's career. Like other political men
with Whig inclinations, Chase had been voted off Cincinnati's city council
during the "Anti-Bank" election of

1 8 4 1 .0o

By that point, political events

had placed the Cincinnati Branch of Second Bank of the United States in
financial distress. In early 1841, the Bank began disputing Chase's legal
fees. Chase admitted that his fees had swelled, due to "the increase of
mortgage suits for debts of large amounts and the magnitude and
importance of the questions in litigated cases." But he stood by his charges.
In return, Bank representatives accused him of mismanaging some of the
property that he had acquired on their behalf, and of cheating the Bank out
of its "just rights" in another major collection case they believed they

105. See STEPHEN J. ROSS, WORKERS ON THE EDGE: WORK, LEISURE, AND POLITICS IN
INDUSTRIALIZING CINCINNATI, 1788-1890 50 (1985).
106. See CHARLES C. HUNTINGTON, A HISTORY OF BANKING AND CURRENCY IN OHIO
BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 96-100 (1910); WILLIAM SMITH & OPHIA SMITH, A BUCKEYE TITAN
300 (1953).
107. See ROSS, WORKERS ON THE EDGE 50-51.
108. See FREDERICK BLUE, SALMON P. CHASE: A LIFE IN POLITICS 45 (1987).
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should have already won. 109 By March 1842 the dispute was in court, with
the Bank obtaining an order for Chase to turn over a list of his cases for the
Bank, then redirecting these matters to a different attorney. "o
During the fee dispute, Chase had blustered that he felt "quite
confident that I can make as much money if not more if left at liberty to act
for clients who will not now employ me because I represent the Bank.""'
But within Cincinnati of the early 1840s, it proved nearly impossible for
Chase to rebuild his practice around a single client in the way he had while
representing the Bank. In early 1843, Nathaniel Wright, the attorney that
Chase had worked with after arriving in Cincinnati in 1830, produced a
bleak memo listing the remaining banking client options. Outside of
Wright's own client, the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company, an
institution which he considered "the safest of the lot," it included fifteen
banks that were in the process of "winding up," heading towards
liquidation, some of them reportedly "fraudulent." Twelve more were
relatively stable, with "ample means," but possessed state charters set to
expire. An additional thirteen, including the Lafayette Bank, Chase's sole
remaining institutional client, were in similarly tenuous political shape.112
The drying up of Cincinnati's banking sector thrust Chase's legal
career back to a second "struggle for subsistence." Beginning in 1839, he
would engage in this struggle with Flamen Ball, a lawyer who had agreed to
turn over two-thirds of firm earnings to Chase.1 13 Removed from the city
council, he stated in a letter in October 1841, Chase vowed "to continue to
focus on my profession until paying my debts off." 14 Together, "Chase &
Ball" would stick with Chase's old formula, advertising that they would
give "particular attention to the collection of claims" in Ohio, and would
also forward claims against residents of other "Western States" to
"competent attornies," promising to remit collections "punctually and
promptly" in a manner "quicker, cheaper, and more advantageous than the

109. See Letter from Chase to Timothy Kirby, Feb. 10, 1841 (Box 20, Kirby Papers,
CHLA); Letter from Timothy Kirby to Chase, Mar. 3, 1843 (Reel 5, Chase Papers, UPA) ("just
rights").
110. See "Response of Salmon P. Chase in Chase v. Dorsey," (1841?); Order for Bank of the
United States v. Chase(Mar. 1842) (Box 35, Kirby Papers, CHLA).
11l. See Letter from Chase to Timothy Kirby, Feb. 10, 1841. Chase also noted, however,
that he was now prevented from taking "the opposing side" in Bank cases. See Chase to Kirby,
Mar. 22, 1841 (Box 20, Kirby Papers, CHLA).
112. See "Memoranda of Ohio Banks, February 1843 in Letter Book of Nathaniel Wright,
Mar. 14, 1839-June 26, 1849 (Box 42, Nathaniel Wright Family Papers, LC).
113. A summary of their business relationship from Chase's perspective is found in Letter
from Chase to Ball, Apr. 22, 1857 (Reel 11, Chase Papers, LC). See also Proposed Agreement
between Chase & Ball and Geo. Hoadley, Sept. 20, 1847; Agreement between Chase and Ball,
Oct. 1, 1849 (Reel 32, Chase Papers, LC).
114. See Letter from Chase to Cleveland, Oct. 22, 1841 (Reel 4, Chase Papers, LC).
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competition.""' 5 In the end, the firm proved to be moderately successful; by
November 1849, Ball would estimate the firm's assets to be worth slightly
over $13,000, enough to permit Chase to enter the U.S. Senate."' 6 Getting
there, however, would involve the firm expanding Chase's client base
beyond Cincinnati's financial elite.
D. Servant of Servants
While still specializing in debt collection, Chase & Ball's work during
the 1840s was actually performed for a different segment of Cincinnati's
population possessing smaller claims to a share of the city's wealth, a group
that Chase and his partner nearly joined themselves. By the time Chase and
Ball severed ties in the 1850s, their firm would spend over fifteen years
counting carpenters, "lumber men," and recent immigrants as some of its
clients, defending them against property seizures and foreclosures and
seeking protections under state insolvency laws while bringing collection
claims on their behalf for modest debts stemming with such working class
activities as "labor and drayage."" 7
In the 1840s, collecting claims "punctually and promptly" still meant
Chase & Ball seizing property and liquidating estates through forced
judicial sales with a heavy use of Ohio's "Judgments and Executions"
law."8 It also meant converting foreclosed mortgages into tangible real
estate. Of the seventeen published cases that the firm was involved in
between 1841 and 1849, seven of them were cases in ejectment, with Chase
& Ball arguing in several that their sole remaining institutional creditor
client, the Lafayette Bank, possessed superior "liens" on mortgaged
properties, permitting transfer upon foreclosure without the bank first
having to be in possession.'1 9 A closer look at Chase & Ball's published
cases, however, underscores that this similarity in subject matter masked a
deeper shift. Sometimes Chase would use one of the modes he had
developed to obtain debtor property to defeat the other, arguing that
interests previously acquired through court-ordered sales could wipe away a
parcel's previous debts and encumbrances, making them ineligible for later
ejectment proceedings for old debts.12 0 In other instances, Chase's
115.

See Letter from Ball to Chase, Dec. 29, 1843 (Reel 5, Chase Papers, UPA).
116. See Ball to Chase, Nov. 13, 1849 (Reel 7, Chase Papers, UPA).
117. See Entries for June 29, 1840 ("lumber men"); May 21, 1857 ("drayage") in CHASE
DIARIES 131, 280; Letter from Ball to Chase, Dec. 27, 1844 (Reel 5, Chase Papers, UPA) (state
insolvency laws).
118. See, e.g., Letter from Chase to Ball, Oct. 23, 1845 (handling an estate sale).
119. See McLean v. Lafayette Bank, 16 F. Cas. 253 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843); see also Lafayette
Bank v. McLaughlin, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 70 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1846)
120. State v. Hoppess, I Ohio Dec. Reprint (1845); Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. 215 (1847);
see also Steamboat Monarch v. Finley, 10 Ohio 384 (1841); Eckert v. Colvin, 10 Ohio Dec.
Reprint 54 (1843); Northern Bank ofKentucky v. Roosa, 13 Ohio 334 (1844); McLean v. Lafayette
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arguments would align even more closely with the interests of debtors, with
the firm representing owners and lessees who were simply attempting to
evade an ejectment or court-ordered seizure and resale.121
What collection work that remained for Chase & Ball within this new
law practice, now consisting of what one of Chase's lawyer friends once
called "a rascally business of chasing poor devils who have nothing . . . to
pay,"1 22 could not cover the firm's expenses. Papers passing between Chase
and Ball indicate that their work instead had to feed into a larger real estate
business, with Chase accepting real estate in lieu of legal fees, or with
Chase directing Ball to purchase real estate at court-ordered sales and to sell
some of these parcels to cover Chase's personal debts. 123 Chase would also
join with Ball to solicit business in eastern cities, offering to serve as the
business "agents" of merchants in Baltimore, New York, and Boston,
managing their western investments in exchange for receiving some of the
proceeds.
At the same time, they would offer to report on the
creditworthiness of Cincinnati's "small traders," many of whom were the
firm's local clients. 124 Such work essentially sought to use Chase's mastery
of Ohio debt collection law to transform a lawyer-client relationship into
the equivalent of a business partnership, and was not always successful. In
Cincinnati, it led to the firm severing ties with Nicholas Longworth, who
accused Chase of incorrectly appropriating (as a form of alternative fee
payment) some of the city lots that he believed he had purchased with
Chase's help. 125 Borrowing against potential future collections even placed
Chase in debt to the Lafayette Bank, one of his few remaining institutional
clients. 126
With his most steady remaining legal business coming from farmers,
storekeepers, small traders, and riverfront laborers by the early 1840s, the

Bank, 16 F. Cas. 253 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843); Robb v. Irwin, 15 Ohio 689 (1846); Stevens v. Hey, 15
Ohio 313 (1846); Lafayette Bank v. McLaughlin, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 70 (1846); Goodrich v.
Rogers, I Ohio Dec. 230 (1847); Perry v. Clarkson, 16 Ohio 571 (1847); Woodson v. State, 17
Ohio 161 (1848); Brisbane v. Stoughton, 17 Ohio 482 (1848); Lawler v. Walker, 18 Ohio 151
(1849); Nolan v. Urmston, 18 Ohio 273 (1849); Ohio Life Ins. Trust Co. v. McCague, 18 Ohio 54
(1849); State v. Guilford, 18 Ohio 500 (1849).
121. See Robb v. Irwin, 15 Ohio 689 (1846).

122. See Letter from Hamilton Smith to Salmon R. Chase (Mar. 1838) (Reel 3, Chase
Papers, LC).
123. See Letter from Chase to Ball (Jul. 3, 1839); Letter from Ball to Chase (Aug. 3, 1841)
(Reel 5, Chase Papers, UPA) (discussing Chase taking some property for himself); Letter from
Ball to Chase (July 23, 1850) (Reel 8, Chase Papers, UPA).
124. See Letter from Ball to Chase (Aug. 13, 1847) (Reel 6, Chase Papers, UPA). See also
Letter from Ball to Tappan (Mar. 10, 1842) (Reel 4, Chase Papers, LC) (explaining the firm also
agreed to perform such work on behalf of Lewis Tappan's "Mercantile Agency")
125. See Letters from Longworth to Chase (Jan. 5, 1840); Letters from Longworth to Chase
(Dec. 12, 1840) (Reel 5, Chase Papers, UPA).
126. See Letters from Ball to Chase (Dec. 17, 1852) (Reel 7, Chase Papers, UPA).
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"equitable commerce" perspective of Chase's new client base began
peeking through the arguments Chase made for his remaining banking
clientele. In 1844, while arguing that the Northern Bank of Kentucky was
entitled to an equal share of a lessee's interest in a parcel of property that
had been seized and sold, Chase asserted that the property interest in the
case should be treated as real estate, and thus partitioned between all
creditors without any priority of creditor liens under Ohio law (rather than
as an article of personal property, which would transfer all of the proceeds
to other creditors who had been earlier to sue). "In the infancy of the
common law," Chase argued, "the possessors of land . .. were generally
farmers or husbandmen, and were regarded, in those feudal times, as an
inferior class, existing rather for the convenience of superiors than for their
own welfare." Rather than being seen as people who could have "any
property of their own," they were seen as the equivalent of Matilda
Lawrence, considered the "bailiffs and servants" of others, with their
interests reverting back to "the lords - the landholders - who made the
laws." Now, in Salmon P. Chase's Ohio, statutes passed by lawmakers
answerable to a non-landowning population had supposedly rendered such
distinctions "a theoretical absurdity."' 2 7
Such arguments were no doubt designed to win over Ohio's Supreme
Court as it was constituted at the time, appointed by the same legislature
that made the state's laws, featuring members with solid Democratic
credentials.12 8 But they were also coming from a more personal place. By
this time, Chase was mixing with members of the city's working class,
meeting with carpenters and workmen and taking on debt collection work
on their behalf. By 1845, he would call a new house he was building
"Hardscrabble Hall," a symbolic reference to the change that was taking

place.129
E. Pivot to the River
Chase's business portfolio also turned more closely to the city's
waterfront. His real estate interests had become enmeshed in the river
trade, from canal lands that he had acquired which emptied into the Ohio
River,13 0 to riverfront land he and another lawyer owned in Indiana, bought
specifically for the purpose of supplying coal to the hundreds of steamboats
passing by. "3' During the 1840s he would also advise and correspond with
127. See N. Bank ofKentucky v. Roosa, 13 Ohio 334, *5-6 (1844).
128. The judge in Northern Bank ofKentucky was Matthew Birchard, appointed by Jackson
to the General Land Office. CARRINGTON T. MARSHALL, A HISTORY OF THE COURTS AND
LAWYERS OF OHIO 244 (Bellamy Storer, 1834).
129. See CHASE DIARIES 171 (entry, Mar. 1, 1845).
130. See Property deeds to Chase (Reel 31, Chase Papers, LC).
131. See Letter from Smith to Chase (Feb. 7, 1843) (Reel 4, Chase Papers, LC); Letter from
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one man seeking to roll over earnings from a Cincinnati debt collection suit
into the purchase of a Pittsburgh steamboat,132 and another man seeking to
purchase an old warehouse made of old "boat bottoms" floating on the Ohio
River.133 By the end of the decade he would also count steamboat captains,
representing the management side of the steamboat business ledger, as
friends and potential clients as well.13 4
Chase's pivot to the river also brought him in closer contact with the
steamboat trade's unskilled workforce, a group he once had dismissed as a
lawless "mob," but which he learned was equipped with a sophisticated
legal consciousness of its own. In 1842, for instance, Chase would begin
mentoring a young German man named Charles Dunning, a recent
immigrant to Cincinnati of "limited means" and limited English who in the
coming years would find work as a bookkeeper and a clerk for riverfront
forwarding commission houses, but who harbored dreams of studying law.
Not finding steady work in Cincinnati but "too proud to become a beggar,"
he would end up in New Orleans, working as a "common hand" loading
and unloading steamboats on that city's levee. While in Cincinnati,
Dunning initially sought out Chase's advice because of his reputation as a
man who went "for equal rights and freedom to all men without
distinction." Now, facing a riverfront life that was "unendurable," rife with
caste-like differences, he turned to Chase again. "I am looked upon and
treated almost like a slave," he informed Chase, "classed with the lowest
dregs of a white population, mixed with those unfortunate beings whom a
cruel fate has doomed to slavery." Part of Dunning's plan in escaping this
lot involved asking Chase's opinion on whether he could gather a modest
sum owed to him by another man. 135 To emerge from his "slave-like"
condition, Dunning sought to make Chase his debt collection lawyer.
In a way, working for such clients during the 1840s forced Chase to
accept the radical path that critics like Charles Hammond had assigned to
him back in 1837. In his published argument for Matilda Lawrence, Chase
had criticized the way that Ohio's legal system seemed to provide "one
measure of liberty for the rich and another for the poor."' 36 In 1837,
Chase's master/servant legal formulation had given him a way to avoid
Smith to Chase (Apr. 28, 1848) (Reel 6, Chase Papers, LC).
132. See Letter from F. B. Thorpe to Chase (Nov. 28, 1840) (Reel 4, Chase Papers, LC).
133. See Letter from S. Hathaway to W. S. Johnston (Mar. 21, 1845) (Reel 5, Chase Papers,
LC).
134. See CHASE DIARIES 177, entry Dec. 2, 1845 (showing that a decade earlier, Chase
sought to collect debts from one steamboat captain who died "completely insolvent"); See Letters
from Chase to J. B. Harris (Jun. 27, 1837); Letter from Chase to Smith (Feb. 28, 1837) (Reel 27,
Chase Papers, LC).
135. See Letter from Charles Dunning to Chase and King (Aug. 23, 1842) (Reel 4, Chase
Papers, LC); Letter from Dunning to Chase (Nov. 24, 1845) (Reel 5, Chase Papers, LC).
136. See Speech by Chase 38-40 (1838).
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turning this critique of Ohio law into an affirmative attack on the state's
class system. But now, after his fall from Cincinnati's fiscal heights, the
hierarchal vision of the world that this formulation represented was fading
from Chase's work.
Collecting debts for a clientele drawn from
Cincinnati's waterfront working class, he would find himself using Ohio's
existing statutory framework to undermine the norm that the Buckeye State
was neatly divided into "masters" and "servants" with differing entitlements
under the law.

III. The Subaltern's Friend: Turning River Boatmen Into a
New Creditor Class
Once dismissed by Chase as a "lawless mob," white litigants from
Cincinnati's hardscrabble steamboat economy became a core element of his
rebuilt legal practice. This Part, by focusing specifically upon Chase's
work in shaping a broad reading of a state statute authorizing lawsuits
against steamboats by name, studies one way in which he successfully
incorporated "equitable commerce" themes of property ownership and
contract into his legal work for Cincinnati's white working class while also
highlighting the special capacity of his arguments to cross Cincinnati's
color line.
A. Missionary to a Steamboat World
Making Ohio debt collection law work for working class clients along
Cincinnati's waterfront set Chase apart from his professional cohort. Other
Cincinnati lawyers with his background would have seen waterfront
laborers in the way that Justice Joseph Story, Timothy Walker's mentor at
Harvard, had seen sailors in the Atlantic world. "Generally poor and
friendless," Story would posit in one opinion, oceangoing seamen "acquire
habits of gross indulgence, carelessness, and improvidence," naturally
"placed under the dominion and influence of men, who have ... acquired a
mastery over them." Most properly, they were best seen as "wards of the
admiralty," meaning that their employment status, from their wages to their
health care, were governed by federal admiralty law, a corpus of inherited
rules and procedures applicable to ocean commerce which Story sought to
incorporate into national law. With boatmen the near-equivalents of
infants, Story would give the federal "shipping papers" that each sea captain
was required to file before engaging in an ocean venture "rigid scrutiny,"
revising their contents when supposedly in a sailor's best interest. 37

137. See Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480 (C.C.D. Me. 1823); see e.g. R. Kent Newmyer,
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY

115-154 (1985); Matthew Taylor Rafferty, THE
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Story's paternalistic system, however, did not exist for boatmen in the
rivergoing west, thanks in part to The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, a U.S.
Supreme Court opinion written by Story himself. In rejecting a federal suit
for wages by the crew of a Kentucky-based steamboat, Story held that
federal admiralty law was restricted to coastal waters within the "ebb and
flow" of the tide.' 38 For Whig lawyers in Cincinnati, this stripped
steamboat hands like Charles Dunning of their remaining legal protections,
reducing them to objects of Christian charity. Thus, when a "Western
Seamen's Friends Society" was established in Ohio, funding missionaries
and the establishment of riverfront chapels to spread the Gospel "to the
wicked sailor and the degraded boatman," Nathaniel Wright, one of Chase's
old mentors, would receive pamphlets encouraging him to contribute to the

cause. 139
For Wright, support for the "Western Seamen's Friends Society," a
charitable organization instructing steamboat captains to sustain "a parental
relation" to their crew, 140 would exist on a separate pro bono plane from his
legal practice. As an attorney for the Ohio Life and Insurance Trust Co.,
Wright would develop arguments assigning most vessel accidents directly
to the "carelessness," "negligence," or "malfeasance" of steamboat crews
acting in dereliction of their duties.141 And when a crew brought a claim for
unpaid wages, Wright would be involved in representing the vessel's
owners, aiming to limit the share his clients would pay.14 2 This work for
the Ohio Life Insurance Co. interpreted Ohio's legal system in a way that
would visit most of the costs of the steamboat trade upon its labor force, in
essence creating some of the conditions that subsequent donations to
charitable organizations like the Seamen's Friend Society would be
intended to offset.
Chase's waterfront legal practice originated from a different direction,
from below. Wright may have painted a picture of seaworthy vessels
wrecked by negligent crews, but Chase represented parties seeking to
collect on policies purchased from Wright's main insurance client. Not

REPUBLIC AFLOAT: LAW, HONOR, AND CITIZENSHIP IN MARITIME AMERICA (2013); Daniel J.

Hulsebosch, Writs to Rights: 'Navigability' and the Transformation of the Common Law in the
Nineteenth Century, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049 (2002).
138. See The S. B. Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. 428 (1825).

139. See "Report of Wm. Andrews, Bethel Missionary at the Port of Cincinnati," June 1858
(Box 76, Nathaniel Wright Family Papers, LC); "Commerce of the West," 1.4 SPIRIT OF THE
LAKES AND BOATMEN'S MAGAZINE 50 (Apr. 1849) in Inland Rivers Collection, Public Library of

Cincinnati and Hamilton County (noting society's outreach to the "degraded boatman").
140. See "Why Shipmasters Should be the Best of Men," 1.3 SPIRIT OF THE LAKES AND
BOATMEN'S MAGAZINE 43-44 (Mar. 1849).

141. See, e.g., "Liability of Mortgage on Steamboats" Gazzam file (Box 67, Wright Family
Papers, LC); Washington Insurance Co. v. Steamboat Zephyr, (Box 71, Wright Papers, LC).

142. See Wood v. Steamer Caroline(1832) (Box 74, Wright Family Papers, LC).
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surprisingly, steamboat officers and crew became men of "intellect" and
"judgment" in the court clippings that Chase collected, turning the narrative
that his mentor told in his court filings on its head.14 3 And while Wright
would side with a vessel's owner in a wage dispute, Chase was also more
likely to see things from the perspective of the crew.
Chase took to this fee-paying work for the river's "oppressed
boatman" with a missionary's zeal, perhaps as another way to align his
professional life with a higher moral calling per Psalm 119. If, according to
newsletters from the Western Seamen's Friend Society, the steamboat was
indeed a "world in miniature," made of up of "distinct classes," God's best
emissaries to this world were, like Chase, "no respecter of persons," equally
comfortable mixing with a steamboat's financiers and the "habitual
growlers" of a steamboat's crew. And if, as another pamphlet instructed,
the best place for a Christian missionary to learn about the steamboat world
was in discussion with the boat's "subalterns," people who stood "on
medium ground - betwixt and between," 44 Chase's accompaniment of
clients like Charles Dunning through the thickets of Ohio's legal system
was another way of engaging in this conversation.
"In our apprenticeship we sometimes had disagreeable work to do,"
one former steamboat hand would later recall, explaining the steamboat
subaltern's point of view. "But at the same time our proud heart was
swelling ... any reflection, whether in pity or scorn, roused our
indignation." 4 5 To serve as a debt collection lawyer for people like thisworkers consigned to positions of "servile drudgery" who strained against
the "tyranny and cruelty" of their superiors, but who took pride in products
of their work and who sought ways that their labor could be converted into
something else-was to translate this perspective into the formal language
of Ohio law.
B. Watercraft Law, Watercraft Lawyer
In 1841, the same year he resigned from his Bank of the United States
solicitor position, Chase began giving the inland river world's "subaltern"
perspective a legal voice by helping to shape the interpretation of a
controversial statute favored by inland river boatmen. Passed in 1840 and
going by the official name of "an Act providing for the collection of claims
against steamboats and other watercrafts, and authorizing proceedings
against the same by name" but simply known as the state's "Watercraft

143. See Howell v. CincinnatiInsurance Co. (Reel 34, Chase Papers, LC).
144. See "Adventures of a Tract," 1.5 SPIRIT OF THE LAKES AND BOATMEN'S MAGAZINE 65

(May 1849) ("no respecter of persons"); "Steamboat Fixtures," 1.3 THE WESTERN PILOT 82-83
(Mar. 1853) ("betwixt and between").
145. See "Steamboat Fixtures," Id.
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Law," this 1840 measure assigned liability to steamboats or other watercraft
"navigating the waters within or bordering upon" the Buckeye State for
debts "contracted by the master, owner, steward, consignee or other agent,
for materials, supplies or labor, in the building, repairing, furnishing or
equipping the same." It also made the vessels liable for "damages arising
out of any contract for the transportation of goods or persons." 4 6
The process to collect was simple: before a court clerk or justice of the
peace, a plaintiff would file a claim against a steamboat's owner, or against
the steamboat itself through an in rem action, listing the vessel itself by
name, borrowing the process of an admiralty proceeding to bring steamboat
property into court even when its precise ownership structure was unknown.
The court officer would then seize the craft to satisfy the demand. Unless
the owner of a boat appeared and posted a bond double the amount claimed,
the vessel would be detained and the matter would follow the normal debt
collection procedures of the 1831 "Act Regulating Judgments and
Executions," where any property held could be "sold upon execution to
satisfy the judgment."l 4 7
Ohio's Watercraft Law became an immediate favorite of Chase &
Ball, using the same procedures that Chase's banking clients had used to
transfer property interests onshore and making them available to a riverfront
clientele. "We seem, in our practice designed as it is," Ball would write to
Chase while singling out the firm's work under this statute, "to be in the
way of making the first moves under new laws."' 4 8 Here, Ball's use of the
adjective "new" was misleading. On its face, the statute was in fact a
pastiche of procedures drawn from other established areas of law. In
addition to borrowing from Ohio's 1831 "Judgments and Executions" act,
its in rem process mimicked federal admiralty procedures and was also
found in the statutes of other inland river states. Meanwhile, the process
that such an in rem suit triggered, with debtor property being seized and
held for unpaid debts associated with labor that had already been
performed, was also similar to mechanic's lien statutes found across the

United States.14 9
Still, as litigated by Chase & Ball, bringing a suit under the law soon
became a radical act. In nearby states, similar watercraft laws were quickly
construed by lawyers and judges as merely permitting an "attachment" of a
steamboat rather than a full in rem suit. Thus, while a steamboat could be
seized and held as collateral for a debt, the actual defendant in such a suit

146. See Joseph Rockwell Swan, STATUTES OF THE STATE OF OHIO, OF A GENERAL

NATURE, INFORCE, AS OF DEC. 7, 1840, 209-210 (1841).
147. STATUTES OF THE STATE OF OHIO, supra note 146.

148. See Ball to Chase, July 19, 1845 (Reel 6, Chase Papers, UPA).
149. See James Willard Hurst, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 391-394 (1964).
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would remain a human being, who could have their steamboat returned after
posting a bond, typically smaller than the disputed debt.15 0 Chase & Ball
successfully argued that Ohio's law would not be interpreted in the same
way. In 1841, while representing a Cincinnati storekeeper seeking payment
for articles furnished to an Ohio-Mississippi steamer called the Monarch,
they successfully brought their client's action on an in rem basis, instigating
a process that one judge admitted had ensured that "the owner of the craft
[wa]s not a party to the suit," and had "no day in court." And they won; the
Monarch could be transferred out of its owner's hands without further
notice.
Once again, Chase was stepping outside of Cincinnati's commercial
law mainstream. Timothy Walker, opposing counsel in the Monarch case,
claimed that now "every boat carries with her a secret lien, for all the debts
contracted by her, not only for labor and supplies in building or repairing,
but also for running her.',152 Writing in the Western Boatman, another
business lawyer named Charles P. James went further: there was really "no
limit to the liability of a boat" under Ohio's Watercraft Law. While
Watercraft Laws of other inland river states followed the rules of traditional
mechanic's lien statutes, requiring laborers to register their claims and then
to act upon them within a short timeframe while ranking their claims
alongside the debtor's other liabilities, Ohio's statute lacked any similar
provisions.' 53 Thus, rather than considering claims against a vessel as a
type of "lien" that would be judged against other debts, later Ohio Supreme
Court decisions would affirm that the Watercraft Law created "liabilities"
for a steamboat that could be prosecuted on an individual basis and that
would not expire once a vessel pushed off from the shores of the Buckeye
State.15 4 Moreover, as first suggested by Chase in the Monarch case,
nothing in the text of the statute seemed to prevent subsequent "innocent
purchasers" of a vessel being held accountable for the vessel's debts on an
individual basis, even if they were unaware of its prior encumbrances. For
critics, this led to the possibility, first mentioned in the Monarch case, that

150. See e.g., Case v. Woolley, 36 Ky. 17 (1837); Broadwell v. Swigert, 46 Ky. 39 (1846);
"Court of Appeals of Kentucky: Sept. 21, 1846: Broadwell and others v. Swigert and Others Collision - Rule of Damages," Western Law Journal (Cincinnati), 4.10 (July 1847): 474; J. Clarke
to Nelson Coleman, Oct. 7, 1848 (Box 1, Nelson Coleman Papers, West Virginia Archives).
151. Steamboat Monarch v. Finley, 10 Ohio 384 (1841).
152. Timothy Walker, "Ohio Reports, Volume Twelfth, by Edwin Stanton," I WESTERN L.
J. II (Aug. 1844) (facing Walker again in 1847, Chase later obtained a verdict adding that in a
case of collision, such liability could also be joint and several). See Goodrich v. Rogers, 5.1
WESTERN LAW J. 20 (Oct. 1847).
153. See "Laws of Ohio," 1.5 WESTERN BOATMAN 181-186 (July 1848); C.P. James,
"Liens on Steamboats," 1.11 WESTERN BOATMAN 405-410 (Aug. 1849).
154. See e.g., Canal-BoatHuron v. Simmons, 11 Ohio 458 (1841); Kellogg v. Brennan, 14
Ohio 72 (1846).
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courts would be forced to "sacrifice the property of one man to pay the
debts of another." 5 5
C. "Recovering the Fruits of their Labors"
By 1847, Timothy Walker would report in the Western Law Journal
that the state's 1840 Watercraft Law now had broad application: it applied
to all bills held against a vessel even if they were unrelated to navigation; it
placed these claims ahead of all mortgage-backed security interests in the
underlying vessel; and it insured that all of those claims that had not been
acted upon would survive a vessel's resale.15 6 By 1848, Ohio's state
legislature would pass an amendment providing that "any person or
persons" could bring a claim against "any" watercraft under the state
statute, "notwithstanding the cause of action may have accrued beyond or
out of the territorial limits of jurisdiction of this State, and although such
craft may not have been, at the time such cause of action accrued,
navigating the waters bordering upon this State." 57 A law first given a
radical reading in the briefs of Chase & Ball had broken from Ohio's
jurisdictional bounds, possibly altering how steamboats were owned and
transferred on an interstate basis.
Perhaps most aggravating of all to Walker, the Watercraft Law was
also seen as applying to claims for crewmen's wages.'5 At the time and
place where this occurred, this was a radical development. In Atlantic
Coast jurisdictions, where federal rules required vessels to specify
crewmen's wages in official "shipping papers," and where suits for wages
were treated as "liens" under federal admiralty jurisprudence and given
priority before other vessel debts, the rules governing the payment of

155. See Steamboat Monarch at 391 (1841)..
156. See Walker, "Supreme Court of Ohio: Lucas County, August Term, 1847," WESTERN
LAW J. 8 (Oct. 1847).
157. Jurists in adjacent jurisdictions refused to give the law extraterritorial effect.
Adjudicating cases involving Lake Erie vessels owned by Ohioans but sometimes mortgaged to
New Yorkers, federal judge Alfred J. Conkling held the law to be a "nullity" within the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of New York; the law was "anomalous" in the lack of
notice it provided, "creating new remedies unknown to the common-law and calculated to
supersede and defeat those provided by the constitution and laws of the United States." See
"District Court of The United States: Northern District of New York, Glenny v. The Globe - The
Watercraft Law - Admiralty Liens," 3.6 WESTERN LAW J. (Mar. 1851): 241. By 1853, Maskell
Curwen, a law partner of Nathaniel Wright's son, was crediting Conkling's assessment in an
updated version of Chase's STATUTES OF OHIO. According to Conkling, the statute worked
"mischievous evils" on the institution of property ownership within the nation's inland rivers and
lakes, authorizing the "arbitrary seizure" and transfer of steamboat property while effecting a
"solemn fraud" on a vessel's securitized creditors. See Maskell Curwen, I THE PUBLIC STATUTES
AT LARGE OF THE STATE OF OHIO: FROM THE CLOSE OF CHASE'S STATUTES 596-600 (1853).

158. See Lewis v. The Schooner Cleveland, 12 Ohio 341 (1843).
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seamen's wages had been relatively clear for some time.159 But along the
Ohio River, where no equivalent federal "shipping papers" requirement
existed, this was a major change. Since the Thomas Jefferson case, a
boatman's employment relationship with an inland river vessel existed on a
largely unwritten basis as an "implied contract." Steamboat managers
sometimes accused vessel crews of exploiting this by "quitting their
employment in the middle of a voyage" while still collecting some of their
pay.160 Ohio River boatmen, however, often told a different story, namely
of steamboat captains routinely placing crewmembers onshore without
paying their wages as a form of vessel discipline.' 6 ' Now, as one
Cincinnati-based boatman's attorney explained, wage claims under Ohio's
Watercraft Law shifted the balance of power. While aiding "deserving
young men in recovering the fruits of their labors, which are justly due
them, and which they can ill afford to lose," it preserved their old self-help
protest remedy of quitting the boat and stepping onshore.' 62
In a legal brief illustrating the world allegedly created by Ohio's
Watercraft Law, one Cincinnati-based business lawyer named Timothy D.
Lincoln detailed how such wage claims were bringing social disorder to the
inland river West. While the Golden Gate, a Cincinnati-to-New Orleans
steamer wholly owned by a man from Indiana, was plying the Mississippi
River near Memphis, a man named Brooks, "a colored hand upon the boat,
became involved in a quarrel with the engineer, and in the quarrel, the
engineer struck him a blow with his knife, which greatly injured him."
Arriving in Cincinnati, Brooks had the temerity to bring a claim under
Ohio's Watercraft Law against the Golden Gate for actions that occurred
beyond the state, forcing the boat to be "seized and held for that injury."
The effect of such suits, Lincoln warned, was "to produce insubordination
among the crew and deck passengers." Riding at the literal bottom of the
vessel, black crewmen had once been subject to orders from the boat
captain or other officers. Now, Lincoln cautioned, even "[t]hey feel quite
independent, since they can sue the boat for any difficulty between them
and the commanding officers, and prove what they wish, especially as
neither the boat or her officers can stop to defend against these small
claims ...

163

159. RICHARD HENRY DANA, THE SEAMEN'S MANUAL 248-259 (1841).
160. See Memorial ofa Number of Citizens ofLouisville, Kentucky, 17 (Sen. Exec. Doc. 13)
(Dec. 13, 1838).
161. See, e.g., Savage Inhumanity, I SPIRIT OF THE LAKES AND BOATMEN'S MAGAZINE 147
(Oct. 1849); ProposedBill, I WESTERN BOATMAN 365-388 (June 1849).
162. See Letter from Rice and Headington to William Dovenor (Jan. 16, 1847) (Box 1,
Steamboats and River History Collection, Missouri History Library, St. Louis, Mo.).
163. Timothy Lincoln, Liability of Steamboats Engaged in Commerce Among the Several
States Under the Water-Craft Law of Ohio, (CHLA). On Lincoln, see GEORGE IRVING READ, ET
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If Chase were still relying on business from the city's financial elite to
support his law practice, Lincoln's story about Brooks v. The Golden Gate
may have been a cautionary tale, forcing him to rethink the expansive
reading that he had given to the state's Watercraft Law. By the end of the
decade, having rebuilt his practice around Ohio's waterfront working class,
he was ready to brush off such critiques. Indeed, as early as 1841, Chase
was carrying the type of work he had performed for white riverhands like
Charles Dunning across the color line, taking on a property dispute for
Griffin Watson, an African-American steamboat steward working onboard
the Ambassador, another Cincinnati-to-New Orleans steamer owned by the
family of the attorney Charles P. James, one of the fiercest critics of the
Watercraft Law.' 64 And while Chase may have seen this work in the same
philanthropic light that some of his professional peers viewed their work for
the city's white boatmen, it took a much more aggressive turn once
incorporated into his legal practice, especially when it came attached with a
fee.

IV. Worlds Beyond Black and White: Working for
Cincinnati Entrepreneurs of Color
Becoming the lawyer of choice for a notable segment of Cincinnati's
African-American population by the early 1840s, Chase's efforts to apply
the same debt collection principles to a black clientele eventually carried
him into the first extended public law reform initiative of his career. This
Part, beginning with Chase's work for black riverboat entrepreneurs and
ending with his efforts to repeal the state's discriminatory "Black Laws,"
also explains how Chase eventually used debt collection concepts as a way
for white Ohioans to imagine the legal and economic challenges faced by
Chase's African-American clientele as their own.
A. A Law Office at War with Itself?
By the time Chase resigned from his office as bank solicitor, leading
members of the Cincinnati's black population-its African-American
steamboat stewards, barbers, clergymen, scholars, "plasterers," and master
carpenters-were calling upon the office of Chase & Ball for legal advice.
Initially, they seem to have been drawn by Chase's representation of
Matilda Lawrence in 1837, an act which apparently solidified his reputation
as a defender of "the rights of the . . . colored man."' 65 For a white lawyer
AL., 2 BENCH AND BAR OF OHIO 109-110 (1897).
164. See CHASE DIARIES 151, 156 (see entries for Feb. 20, 1841 and Mar. 15, 1841).
165. See, e.g., W. Cuthbert Whitehurne to Chase, Jan. 4, 1840 (Reel 5, Chase Papers, LC)
(describing an African-Jamaican scholar at Oberlin, seeking a law clerkship with Chase); CHASE
DIARIES 163, 195-96 (entry for Apr. 30, 1843) (describing Wiley Reynolds, as a housepainter, and
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seeking to rebuild his practice in 1841, their business represented a
potential "growth area." As of 1840, Cincinnati's official "colored"
population stood at 2,240, nearly 5% of the city's overall total.16 6 Traveling
downstream to the Queen City as an editor for Frederick Douglass' North
Star, the Pittsburgh-based black activist Martin R. Delany would soon
observe "many families of wealth" within this group.' 6 7 Two years later, he
would note that "a respectable share of the market trade" in Cincinnati was
carried on by "colored men" who also kept several of the city's "steamboatprovision shops."l 68 Indeed, by 1850, 20% of Cincinnati's 954 AfricanAmerican men reporting occupations were working directly in river tradealigned fields, either as a boatman, river hand, cook, or steward, with only
4% listed in the role as household "servant," Matilda Lawrence's old line of
work.169
Denounced by one white newspaper editor as "laboring, when they do
labor, in competition with white citizens, and when they do not, subsisting
by plunder,"170 free African-American riverboat workers like Griffin
Watson actually occupied what one contemporary African-American pastor
called a "position of rank" within 1840s Cincinnati. Taking to the water,
moving between free soil and the "Cotton Kingdom," they had, in the
words of some black boatmen, escaped "The Big Jail" of dry land, earning
as much as $200 per month and often acquiring property in the ports that
their vessel served.17 ' A Virginia-born man of "mulatto" complexion
variously described as a "steward" and a "steamboatman" in census entries
and listed as the head of an eight-person household as of 1850, Griffin
Watson was a representative of this class.172 In 1841, he had engaged
Chase's service like many of Chase's white clients, as an expectant
capitalist rather than as a runaway slave, apparently attempting to prevent a
parcel of land that he held from being foreclosed upon.
pastor of Cincinnati's African Methodist Episcopal Church); (entry for Jan. 3, 1848) (describing
him as a "Colored man" and "plasterer"); (entry for July 5, 1848) (describing him as a barber).
166. See NIKKI TAYLOR, FRONTIERS OF FREEDOM 20 (2005).

167. See Letter from Martin R. Delany to Frederick Douglass (June 9, 1848), MARTIN
DELANY: A DOCUMENTARY READER (2003). See also Carter G. Woodson, The Negroes of
CincinnatiPriorto the Civil War, 1.1 J. OF NEGRO HIST. 122 (1916).
168. See Martin R. Delany, Colored Citizens of Cincinnati, THE NORTH STAR (June 15,
1849).
169. See Taylor, FRONTIERS OF FREEDOM 210-211 (2005).

170. See William Cheek and Aimee Lee Cheek, John Mercer Langston and the Cincinnati
Riot of 1841, in RACE AND THE CITY: WORK, COMMUNITY AND PROTEST IN CINCINNATI, 1820-

1970 29-69 (1993).
171.
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(1897). On "the Big Jail," see MARY WHEELER, STEAMBOATIN' DAYS: FOLK SONGS OF THE
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M432_687; Page: 259B; Image: 534), Ancestry.com.
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Like the lawyers making out Brooks' Watercraft Law claim in the
Golden Gate case, Chase sought to make Ohio law work for clients of color
like Griffin Watson. Once again, this set him apart from his colleagues.17 3
Under Ohio's so-called "Black Laws," Timothy Walker explained to Alexis
de Tocqueville in 1831, a "negro has no political rights; he cannot be
sworn, he cannot bear witness against a white." Ever the polite Whig,
Walker admitted that this could lead to some "injustices," but he believed
that as a dutiful lawyer his hands were tied. When a black man who had
"furnished a very great number of foodstuffs to the master of a steamboat"
sought Walker's help but could not produce any white people to testify on
his behalf, Walker turned him away. 174 By representing men like Griffin
Watson a decade later, Chase would not.
Like the claims he made for the bank, making property claims on
behalf of a black clientele was explosive work within antebellum
Cincinnati. With black property ownership seen by some Cincinnati whites
as being the equivalent of a violation of law, one African-American resident
would explain in 1840 that "he did not feel any interest in laying up
property," since he feared that any house he built "would be pulled down
over [his] head by a mob."'7 One year later, such fears were affirmed: in
September 1841, a white crowd attacked black Cincinnati residents on the
street (killing at least two), looting their homes and throwing the
Philanthropist'sprinting press into the Ohio River.176
Ball reported to a traveling Chase that the 1841 disturbances had been
instigated by some of the city's white "river loafers" against the city's
African-American residents, who in turn attempted to "protect their persons
and property and to protect their rights." 7 7 The Cincinnati Enquirer,one of
the city's Democratic newspapers, identified another possible source: white
dismay over a recent court ruling obtained by Salmon P. Chase. 7 1
Earlier in 1841, in a near-reprise of the Matilda Lawrence case, Chase
had defended a woman "of negro complexion" living in Cincinnati named

173. The possible exception was Cincinnati's John Jolliffe, a white attorney also known for
taking on such work, but without the political or commercial success of Chase. See John
Wertheimer, et al., Willis v. Jolliffe: Love and Slavery on the South Carolina-OhioBorderlands,
FREEDOM'S CONDITIONS INTHE U.S.-CANADIAN BORDERLANDS (2011).
174. George Wilson Pierson, TOCQUEVILLE AND BEAUMONT IN AMERICA 565 (1938)
(transcript of Walker's 1831 interview with Tocqueville); see also STEPHEN MIDDLETON, THE
BLACK LAWS (2005).
175. Cheek and Cheek, John Mercer Langston and the Cincinnati Riot of 1841, RACE AND
THE CITY 36 (1993).
176. See Letter from Chase to Cleveland (Oct. 22, 1841) (Reel 4, Chase Papers, LC). On
the 1841 events, see Dreadful Riot and Loss of Life; The City-The Mob; Reign of Terror Again in
Cincinnati;Riots and Mobs, Confusion and Bloodshed, THE PHILANTHROPIST (Sept. 8, 1841).

177. See Letter from Ball to Chase (Sept. 4, 1841) (Reel 5, Chase Papers, UPA).
178. RACE AND THE CITY, supra note 168, at 42-44 (1993).
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Mary Towns who had been seized and brought before a Hamilton County
associate judge, and had won. Towns had been claimed under the name of
"Rose" by a Kentucky man who alleged that he had "lost her services for
eleven years" since her move to Ohio. Before Judge Nathaniel C. Read,
state prosecutor in suit against James Birney four years earlier, Chase
repeated his argument that Ohio's constitution did not recognize such a
property-based claim in another human being. But he also incorporated an
argument that he apparently obtained in conversation with Towns herself,
namely that she moved to Ohio with her claimant's written permission, and
that her putative owner could not produce any evidence that she now
"owed" any service to him. Here, Chase was able to subtly analogize
Towns' case with that of a white person seeking to avoid imprisonment for
not paying an alleged debt. This was a strategic move, an attempt to require
that the case proceed in "strict conformity" with Ohio debtor/creditor law
rather than Ohio's less-forgiving statute regarding the recovery of "fugitives
from service." Before Towns could be deprived of her liberty and pressed
back into service, Chase argued, a "debt" would need to be proven, in the
same way as it would in a collection against a white defendant.
In May 1841, Judge Read had agreed with Chase, finding that the
affidavit produced by Towns' putative master provided "insufficient"
information regarding her former status to authorize her being sent back to
Kentucky. 179 Chase cheered the Towns decision in a letter to a friendso but
the city's Democratic Cincinnati Enquirer alleged that the Towns verdict,
applying a procedural strategy used by white debtors to an alleged
"escaping servant," had awakened a "reckless spirit of fanaticism" among
the city's blacks. This, in turn, was supposedly alienating Southern traders
who were so concerned about the security of their human chattel that they
were sending their business elsewhere. The court decision in the Towns
case, one white steamboat captain was heard to complain, had already taken
"$100 out of his pocket."18' The Cincinnati crowd of September 1841, the
paper intimated, had decided to take the law into their own hands,
destroying black property as a forceful reassertion of the Buckeye State's
alleged proper social order.18 2
179. See Law Case, CINCINNATI DAILY GAZETTE, May 21, 1841.

Concurrently, the state

Supreme Court had held in a case titled State v. Farrthat a slave that had been voluntarily brought
into the state became "a free man at the moment he touche[d] the soil of Ohio." See Important
Decision on Slavery, LOWER SANDUSKY WHIG (May 27, 1841). See also PAUL FINKELMAN, AN
IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 156180 (1981).
180. See Letter from Chase to Cleveland (May 18, 1841) (Box 13, Chase Papers, HSP).
181. See A Mob in Cincinnati, PHILANTHROPIST, June 30, 1841.
182. See, e.g., Riots and Mobs, Confusion and Bloodshed, THE PHILANTHROPIST, Sept. 8,
1841. By the end of the disturbance, the crowd was consolidating its winnings under the auspices
of formal law, with town sheriffs called to disarm and arrest black men that had allegedly taken up
weapons to defend their homes. Moreover, a "Citizens' Meeting" was called at the city court
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The white and black sides of Chase's docket seemed to be at literal
war with one another, provoked in part because of Chase's own work. In
1841, Chase saw the bloodshed, property destruction, and thefts perpetrated
by the city's white working class against the city's black population in the
same way he saw the anti-Birney events as 1836. Both were instances of
"lawless violence" taken in contravention of Ohio law.' 83 Nevertheless, as
late as 1850, Flamen Ball would report that the competitors of Chase & Ball
could drum up business among recent white arrivals from Kentucky by
arguing that their clients had "left a state of Negroes to live in a state which
was governed by White people."1 84 If Chase's work for clients like Mary
Towns sought to remove any support for such an interpretation of Buckeye
law, it would need to do so by not offending this other pool of clients.
Moreover, it would need to win over old Democratic opponents like
Nathaniel C. Read. In 1841, Chase had momentarily won over Read by
portraying Mary Towns as an alleged debtor worthy of judicial charity. To
convert his white clients, he would soon take a more radical step, presenting
subsequent clients in Towns' position in the same light as Chase's white
working class clientele, namely as creditors seeking to collect "debts" to
which they were due.
B. Theorizing Slavery's Liquidation
Chase may have originally received the idea of portraying his alleged
slave clients as creditors in their own right from Lewis Tappan, one of his
white clients, a New York financier and one of the nation's leading
abolitionist activists. Drawn to Chase through Chase's affiliation with
James G. Birney (who Tappan had funded as one of his Southern claims
agents), Tappan had employed Chase's firm as one of his debt-collecting
"counsellors" in the West since 1837, the year of the Matilda Lawrence
case. 185 A credit reporting entrepreneur, Tappan would receive reports from
his Southern agents that aligned his financial interests with his moral views,
with Tappan receiving missives depicting white Southern businessmen as a
mix of "irresponsible cotton buyers and "transient adventurers," people
lacking "the means, or the skill to sustain themselves."' 8 6

house, where Judge Read was made to address the crowd and resolutions were passed to carry out
the state's Black Laws "to the letter until... our Southern Brethren may be assured."
183. See Letter from Chase to Cleveland (Oct. 22, 1841) (Box 13, Chase Papers, HSP);
("lawless violence" of 1841 events).

184. See Letter from Ball to Chase, Dec. 12, 1850 (Reel 7, Chase Papers, UPA).
185. See Letter from Lewis Tappan to Chase (Oct. 7, 1837) (Reel 3, Chase Papers, LC);
Letterpress Memo on Tappan work (Feb. 1845) (Reel 27, Chase Papers, LC).
186. See, e.g., SHELDON CHURCH, 3 CREDIT REPORTS OF MERCHANTS THROUGHOUT THE

WEST, SOUTH, AND SOUTHWEST 1025, 115-118 (1844-1847) (Dun and Bradstreet Corp. Records,
Baker Library, Harvard Business School).
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While the slaveholding Kentuckians that Chase occasionally faced in
court may have styled themselves as men of property and standing, Tappan
would press Chase to see them as people invested in an indebted form of
property subject to immediate liquidation. In 1842, when Chase shared a
copy of an antislavery speech that Chase had written for the fledging
"Liberty Party" which still allowed for the occasional "restoration of
fugitives from service, on claim of the party to whom their services are
due," Tappan challenged his wording. "I contend that no services are due
from a slave," he wrote. "Due?! Let them show a contract by which a slave
has agreed to serve."'
By 1844, Chase would write that he now
considered himself a "full convert" to Tappan's contract-based view. If
Chase ever became a judge in Ohio, he promised, "and a fugitive slave in
Ohio should bring an action against his pursuing master for wages during
his whole time of his servitude, he [w]ould have judgment."' 8 8
This was a radical position to take. Considered "bound to service "as a
matter of law, a slave could only receive his or her freedom, the
conventional wisdom went, through a voluntary act performed by his her
master solely at that person's discretion; a slave could not demand freedom
or "wages" over their owner's objections. At the time that Chase argued the
Mary Towns case, for instance, Kentucky law regarded a master's power
over his or her slave as a property right tantamount to real estate- it was an
inheritable interest that could be very difficult for creditors to seize,
typically something that only its present owner, in his or her own
beneficence, could dispose of.189 Moreover, while regarding a master's
decision to settle in Ohio with their slaves as an act of constructive
manumission, Kentucky law also allowed bondspeople to purchase their
own freedom with their master's agreement, and to enforce agreements to
manumit through the mechanism of a "freedom suit." 90 The normal
operation of this form of emancipation, not any wage-based claim, had
helped to build Cincinnati's African-American community. In 1834, for
instance, one survey would count 476 people of color living within the
Queen City that had purchased their own freedom at a combined cost of
$215,522.191
187. See Letter from Tappan to Chase (Mar. 13, 1842) (Reel 5, Chase Papers, UPA).
188. See Letter from Chase to Tappan (Apr. 3, 1844) (Reel 5, Chase Papers, UPA). The
same result would follow, Chase further guaranteed, if he became a federal judge, which of course
he eventually would.
189. See Ivan E. McDougle, SLAVERY INKENTUCKY, 1792-1865, 30-70 (1919).
190. See, e.g., C. S. MOREHEAD AND MASON BROWN, I A DIGEST OF THE STATUTE LAWS
OF KENTUCKY 608 (1834); Marion Lucas, A HISTORY OF BLACKS IN KENTUCKY: FROM SLAVERY

TO SEGREGATION 101117 (1992); Letter from Edgar Needham to Chase (Feb. 9, 1850) (Reel 7,
Chase Papers, LC) (reports on "freedom suits" brought in Louisville, Kentucky); George Amos
Petition, Fayette, Kentucky (Mar. 8, 1856) (Box 1, Black History Collection, LC).
191. RACE AND THE CITY, supra note 168, at 33.
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At the same time he was developing his wage-based understanding of
emancipation, Chase was in fact facilitating his clients, both black and
white, to operate within this established system. Throughout the 1840s he
would broker the purchase of slaves from willing masters by abolitionist
buyers,' 92 would assist black Cincinnati residents drawing up "subscription
papers" to raise the requisite money to purchase family members out of
bondage,193 and would turn to wealthy clients like Nicholas Longworth to
pay the jail fees of putative slaves and to broker their release.19 4 Once such
transactions were complete, he would generate the necessary papers
certifying a former slave's new status within the Buckeye State. Go to
"Lawyer Chase," one abolitionist "buyer" summarized to his recent
"purchase" in Cincinnati. For a small fee, he could "address a note to the
clerk of the office where the colored people are set free.", 95
The new understanding that Chase developed in conversation with
Tappan turned the orthodox process of emancipation, based on a mix of
white profit-taking and philanthropy, on its head. Rather than either
something that could be offered or withheld by a white person as a
revocable gift, or something that could be purchased from a willing white
seller, mastery over black labor time was a property interest endowed with
the same legal status as a foreclosed farm claimed by the Second Bank of
the United States, or a share in an indebted steamboat claimed by a
disgruntled boatman: it could be summarily transferred into the hands of exslaves, now seen as another new creditor class, without an ex-master's
consent. In effect, this potentially turned a slave's running away from an
illegal act-a "theft" of someone else's property-into a type of lawful
quantum meruit claim against a master's estate.
C. Accompanying Self-Emancipation
If Chase developed this alternate theory of slave-driven,
nonconsensual emancipation in discussion with Lewis Tappan, his work for
his "fugitive slave" clientele brought it to life. Before going to trial in the
Towns case, Chase received an offer from her putative master under the
conventional emancipation system, promising to relinquish his claim and
"deliver her up" in exchange for $550 and a formal acknowledgment that
she had always been his property. In apparent consultation with Towns,
Chase rejected this proposal, opting instead for the strategy of making

192. See, e.g., Letter from George Winston to Chase (Apr. 10, 1846) (Reel 5, Chase Papers,
LC); Mrs. H. Worsham to Chase (Sept. 16, 1848) (Reel 6, Chase Papers, LC).
193. See Letter from Chase to Stanley Matthews (Jan. 27, 1849), in 2 THE SALMON P.
CHASE PAPERS 219-223 (1994).
194. See Glorious Old Thief CHI. TRIBUNE, Jan. 28, 1893.
195. See Letter from Hannah Giles to Chase (Apr. 18, 1845) (Reel 5, Chase Papers, LC).
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Towns' master prove her "debt" to him.1 9 6
Coming full circle, by Milton Clarke's hearing in 1843, Chase went
further, offering a statement from Clarke himself that Archibald Logan,
Clarke's putative master, not Clarke, was most accurately seen as the party
with a "debt" coming due. While the argument that Chase offered in Milton
Clarke's case matched the alternate theory that Chase had worked out with
Tappan, it was also one that Clarke would have been able to independently
corroborate. Claiming to be free since birth, Clarke would later write that
he saw his freedom confirmed through several years of working on the
river, where he came in contact with the "equitable commerce" discourse of
white boatmen, and where he would begin the process of what one of his
activist friends would call his own "self-emancipation."l 9 7
As Clarke would later explain, Archibald Logan had permitted a
teenage Clarke to hire himself out as a musician to riverboats traveling in
the Ohio-Mississippi River in the 1830s, perhaps aware of the tenuous
claims that he held over Clarke's time. When Clarke learned that Logan
was nevertheless pocketing some of the proceeds, he had first threatened to
quit, then angled for a compromise: he would own his own instruments, and
he would keep half of what he earned. For Clarke, this agreement was
empowering, turning the relationship between Clarke and Logan into a type
of business partnership and establishing that Logan lacked a "right to the
annual rent which I paid for my own body."
Equipped with this
understanding, he eventually decided "to strike for liberty." 98 Once
arriving in Ohio in 1841, he would send a letter to Logan explaining that he
never intended to return, arguing that Logan's "care" was not worth the two
hundred dollars per year that he had been paying for it. As such, he
considered his "partnership" with Logan summarily dissolved, with its
wronged member seizing its most prized asset-the full use of Clarke's
time-as an equitable offset.199
By 1844, Clarke would put this claim in more formal terms in the
pages of the Boston Chronicle,an abolitionist paper, publishing an itemized
"demand" against the estate of Logan. "I worked for Mr. Logan for about
ten years, for which he has never paid me the first dollar." As a result,
Logan was in fact in debt to him for at least $1,000, representing ten years

196. See Letter from J. F. Conover to Chase (May 11, 1841) (Reel 4, Chase Papers, LC).
197. The concept of "self-emancipation" was used most prolifically by Henry Bibb, another
ex-slave refugee from Kentucky. See. e.g., Henry Bibb, American History Coming to Light,
VOICE OF THE FUGITIVE, May 20, 1852. On Bibb's association with Lewis Clarke, Milton
Clarke's brother, see Letter from Henry Bibb to Lewis Tappan (Mar. 4, 1850) (Black Abolitionist
Papers, ProQuest LLC).
198. See NARRATIVE OF THE SUFFERINGS OF LEWIS AND MILTON CLARKE, supra note 5, at
77-83.
199. Id. at 47.
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of labor for $100 per year. "I consider the above a very moderate charge,"
he wrote, "and actually due me, and intend to collect it if I can." 20 0
Chase's 1843 representation of Clarke provided an early opportunity to
extend Clarke's claim beyond the realm of expressive rhetoric, identifying
ways that it could be accorded a more permanent place within the bounds of
Ohio law. As of 1843, the result of their collaboration was inconclusive;
Chase's attempt to make Clarke's claimants prove Clarke's "debt" was not
accepted in the same way it had been in the Towns case, and Milton Clarke
would eventually slip out of a sheriff s grasp on murkier legal grounds. But
in adopting the business ledger language of "credit" and "debt" and then
giving it an "equitable commerce" valence capable of turning one's labor
into a claim for wages, Chase had found a way to intellectually align his
work for African-American clients like Clarke with his work for his
hardscrabble white clientele. He would spend the remainder of the decade
working to melt away the distinctions that still existed on Ohio's statute
books between these two groups, seeking to make the process of what
Milton Clarke called "self-emancipation" available to all.
D. Towards a Constitutional Theory of "Equal Justice"
What was the world that Chase imagined clients like Milton Clarke
occupying upon self-emancipation? The subsequent lives of Clarke and his
brother Lewis offer a possible snapshot. Milton Clarke would stay in the
United States, supporting an extended household in Cambridge,
Massachusetts while serving on a town council and eventually working for
the U.S. Treasury Department.20 1 Meanwhile, a few years after resolving
never to "work for a man who would not work for him," his brother Lewis
would decide to emigrate to western Ontario, where he maintained a
household of ten people while farming on land lawfully acquired from the
British Crown. He would also serve as a trustee for an organization that
had purchased thirty acres of farmland and a woodyard for the use of exslave refugees. The goal, a pamphlet for the organization explained, was to
build up a group of independent Afro-Canadian farmers whose success
would undermine the notion that people of color could not manage their
202
own economic affairs.
With lives focused on converting one's skills and labor into property

200. See Letter from Milton Clarke to Messrs. Leavitt and Alden, BOSTON MORNING
CHRONICLE (Sept. 12, 1844).
201. See Story of a White Slave, NEW YORK SUN, Dec. 9, 1900 (Siebert Papers, Ohio
Historical Society, Columbus, Oh.).
202. See New England Colored Citizens' Convention, LIBERATOR, Aug. 26, 1859 ("never
work for a man"); The Agricultural, Mechanical, and EducationalAssociation of Canada West,
CONSTITUTION AND CIRCULAR OF THE ASSOCIATION (1859) (Rare Pamphlet, New York Public

Library).
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ownership, the post-Lake County lives of the Clarke brothers shared the
same objectives of white clients drawn from Cincinnati's waterfront
working class. For Milton Clarke, the son of a white man and a "mulatto"
woman, this comparison went beyond mere analogy. Considering himself a
"white slave" in his steamboat days during the 1830s, he would exit life
during the late 1890s insisting to interviewers that he had "not the slightest
trace of negro blood in his veins."203 Viewed from a modem perspective,
Clarke's evasion of his African heritage may appear tragic, a rejection of
part of himself.20 4 But during his Ohio days, it was also unfortunately one
of the safest strategies that he could take when seeking to acquire property
and protect his gains. In addition to facilitating the return of alleged
runaway slaves, the state's "Black Laws" (statutes passed in 1804 and
1807) required free people of color entering the state to post a special bond,
restricted the acceptance of black testimony in court, and placed free blacks
under several professional and legal disabilities.205
Forced to operate within the confines of a hostile legal system,
Cincinnati's most successful African-American riverfront entrepreneurs
sought to manipulate it in their favor. Samuel T. Wilcox, for instance, a
man born free, penniless, and "mulatto" in Ohio, would rise from steamboat
steward in the 1830s to establish his own line of accounts within the OhioMississippi River trade by 1850, eventually earning enough to move
onshore to establish a forwarding house and acquire real estate of his own,
relying on the long-distance nature of the steamboat trade to avoid color
prejudice along the way. "There are doubtless now many merchants in
New York, Boston and Baltimore ... who have been dealing with S. T.
Wilcox," Martin R. Delany would report when summarizing his rise, "and
never until the reading of this notice of him, knew that he was a colored
man."206
Like Milton Clarke's brother Lewis, who would insist upon a "white
slave" persona while simultaneously participating in "colored citizens"'
conventions in the United States and Canada, 2 07 the race-bending strategy of
black waterfront entrepreneurs like Wilcox also masked a deeper opposition
to the forces pushing him to assume a white identity. While Wilcox may
have benefited from his trading partners confusing him for a white man, he

203. Story of a White Slave, supra note 199.
204. See, e.g., Allyson Hobbs, When Black Becomes White: The Problem of Racial Passing
in American Life (Mar. 2009) (PhD Dissertation, Univ. of Chicago).
205. FRONTIERS OF FREEDOM, supra note 21, at 203204.
206. MARTIN R. DELANY, THE CONDITION, ELEVATION, EMIGRATION AND DESTINY OF THE

COLORED PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES 9798 (1852); Samuel T. Wilcox, in 1850 U.S. Census,

Cincinnati Ward 1, Hamilton County, Ohio (M432, Reel 687, p. 52B, National Archives).
207. Lewis Clarke, see A White Slave's Experience, SIGNAL OF LIBERTY, Jan. 9, 1843; New
EnglandColored Citizens' Convention, LIBERATOR, Aug. 26, 1859.
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told one antislavery newspaper he had initially entered the shipping
business as an "experiment" to prove that "colored people could do
something" on their own. And after acquiring more than $20,000 in real
estate in town, he would take stock in several banks in an activist's spirit,
pointedly ensuring that there may be at least "one colored man there to
vote."208
Chase's commercial representation of clients in Wilcox's position
turned everyday business lawyering into a type of law reform. If Chase's
African-American
clients-stewards,
barbers,
tradesmen,
and
chambermaids-were capable of becoming Samuel Wilcox if they were
mistaken for "white," the only thing apparently holding them back, Chase
would learn to argue, were laws consigning them to a marginal status if
designated as "black." Like slavery itself, which by the 1840s Chase would
see as a regulatory social institution persisting solely by "force" based on an
"inferior law" which violated "the law of creation," 209 Chase would begin to
see laws restricting the access of his free clients of color within the OhioMississippi River economic system as fundamentally inconsistent with the
true spirit of American law. In 1842, Chase would write about supporting a
petition sent by Cincinnati merchants protesting "the laws of Southern
states which authorize the imprisonment of colored firemen, cooks, and
stewards" onboard inland river vessels.210 Under such "Negro Seamen"
laws, Chase had witnessed one of his free black clients imprisoned once
reaching New Orleans and then sold for her jail fees, and another denied
steamboat passage altogether because of her "colored skin" 2 11
For Chase, such laws, restricting some of his clients from seeking out
their best economic prospects within the Ohio-Mississippi system, were
examples of a larger suite of discriminatory statutes which he deemed
unconstitutional. As "citizens of Ohio," he would maintain, the "colored
persons" within his new client base were entitled by "the Constitution of the
Union to the same immunities . . .

as the . . . white citizens" of other

212
states.22
As Chase had outlined in the preface to his Statutes of Ohio in
1832 and would repeat through the 1850s, he saw Ohio's constitution as
affirming principles of governance first outlined in the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, a piece of federal legislation whose earlier drafts came

208. Condition of the Free Condition of Colored People of the United States, CHRISTIAN
EXAMINER, Mar. 1859.

209.

See Chase, RECLAMATION OF FUGITIVES FROM SERVICE (Jones v. Van Zandt

Argument) 215 (1847); Letter from Chase to Lewis Tappan (Mar. 18, 1849) (Reel 5, Chase
Papers, LC)
210. See Letter from Chase to Tappan (Feb. 15, 1843) (Reel 4, Chase Papers, LC).
211. See Letter Extract to Stewart Renham (Dec. 13, 1843) (Box 17, Chase Papers, LC);
Letter from Chase to Cleveland (Feb. 3, 1845) (Box 17, Chase Papers, HSP).
212. See Letter from Chase to Cleveland (Feb. 3, 1845); supra note 209.
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from the pen of Thomas Jefferson, author of the Declaration of
Independence, a document which Chase in turn maintained stood for "equal
rights for all." 213 For Chase, Jefferson's theory of "equal rights,"
incorporated into the state's constitution, ran throughout a proper reading of
Buckeye law, even if some of the restrictions contained within the state's
"Black Laws" were in fact also incorporated into the text of the state's
constitution itself. In an 1845 speech, Chase portrayed such provisions as
defective features that should be removed. "True Democracy makes no
enquiry about the color of the skin or the place of nativity, or any other
circumstances of condition," he would assert. "In communities of men it
recognizes no distinctions founded on mere arbitrary will." 2 14
This 1845 speech, in which Chase assailed Ohio's Black Laws and
pointed towards a legal future sympathizing so "truly and deeply with the
poor, the destitute, [and] the oppressed" that it recognized "no classes and
privileges," was given in a church before leading members of Cincinnati's
African-American community. Its ostensible occasion was to accept an
award from the city's "colored inhabitants" for his work on a case involving
Samuel Watson, an Arkansas-based bondsman who, after stepping off one
New Orleans-to-Pittsburgh steamer and onto the Cincinnati public landing,
was proactively incarcerated by his master's agent and eventually returned
to that man's custody. In a letter to a New Hampshire friend, Chase
described Watson in a freeman's terms-as merely a "poor man" subject to
restrictions imposed "by force without legal process."2 15 While his 1837
work for Matilda Lawrence may have originated from Chase's family ties
to James G. Birney, a white man, by 1845 Chase's work on Watson's
matter had become an allegory for Chase's pledge to erase "every vestige of
oppression" from Ohio's statute book on behalf of his free black
professional clientele, the group funding Watson's defense. 2 16
In 1845, Judge Nathaniel Read, perhaps still burned by the memory of
213. See, e.g., Salmon P. Chase, I STATUTES OF OHIO AND OF THE NORTHWESTERN
TERRITORY 193 (1833); Jefferson's Birthday Speech (Mar. 29, 1839); Lecture on Slavery, Boston,
18541855 (Box 17, Chase Papers, HSP); Memo on the Ordinance of 1787 (Box 20, Chase Papers,
HSP).
214. SALMON P. CHASE, ADDRESS AND REPLY OF A PRESENTATION OF A TESTIMONIAL TO
S. P. CHASE BY THE COLORED PEOPLE OF CINCINNATI 22 (1845).
215. See Letter from Chase to Editors of the AMERICAN CITIZEN (Apr. 4, 1845); and Chase
to Cleveland (Feb. 3, 1845) (Box 17, Chase Papers, HSP).
216. TESTIMONIAL TO S.P. CHASE, supra note 214, at 18. It is notable that Chase argued
this case before Judge Read at the same time that President-elect James K. Polk, a slaveholding
Tennessee Democrat, was passing through town on way to his inauguration. Chase had
unsuccessfully lobbied Polk to take antislavery stances during the 1844 election. At the same time
that he heard the Watson case, Judge Read spoke at a Cincinnati session in Polk's honor. See
Letter from Polk to Chase, et al (Apr. 3, 1844) in 7 CORRESP. OF JAMES K. POLK 1056 (1989);
Letter from Read to Polk (Feb. 4, 1845) in 9 CORRESP. OF POLK 845. See also Letter from Chase
to Trowbridge (Mar. 19, 1864) (Box 14, Chase Papers, HSP).
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the 1841 uprising against his Mary Towns verdict, had ruled against some
of Chase's arguments in Watson's case, restating the standard argument
among Cincinnati's bar that Ohio was "a government of white
men . . formed by white men and for white men."2 17 Two years later,
however, Chase would challenge this assumption in a debt collection case
for John Woodson, one of his free black clients, a "mulatto" master
carpenter and officeholder in a black-owned joint stock company renting
property to white Cincinnatians. In 1847, Chase had been paid by
Woodson to prevent a young man in the city's "colored orphan asylum"
from being sent across the river to a white claimant from Kentucky.2 18
Following Woodson's death a year later, Chase placed Woodson's estate
under the administration of Chase's brother and defended it from the claims
of white creditors in a probate suit brought by the state of Ohio, using
"mulatto" testimony as part of his defense, despite laws barring the use of
such evidence against "parties" that were deemed white. "Is 'the state"'
(technically the opposing party in the Woodson probate suit) "equivalent to
"a white person? " Chase asked rhetorically, answering the question
himself: "We think not."219
As Chase saw it in State v. Woodson, Ohio's constitution, endowing all
people with "certain natural, inherent, and inalienable rights," invalidated
any efforts to exclude "any entire class of persons" on "grounds of race or
color." 2 20 In essence, he explained a few years earlier, the state's Black
Laws were an illegitimate attempt to introduce "the Aristocratic principle"
back into the Buckeye State, mandating a series of "privileges for the higher
classes, and restrictions for the inferior." "The colored people are not alone
interested in this matter," he had insisted when defending Watson back in
1845. "Every law on the statute book [that is] so wrong and mean that it
cannot be executed, or felt, if executed, to be oppressive and unjust, tends to
the overthrow of all law, separating in the minds of the people the idea of
law from the idea of right." If Watson could be seized by his putative
master's agent solely "upon his bare claim, unsupported by evidence than
his own naked statement," he had argued before Read in 1845, "every
person of every complexion might be in like manner seized and held." 2 2 1
As in the Mary Towns case, Chase made his argument in State v.
Woodson before a white Democrat judge and won, demonstrating again

217. The State v. Hoppess, 2 WESTERN LAW J. 6 (Mar. 1845).
218. See Entries for Feb. 1847 in CHASE DIARIES 182184. On Woodson, see WILLIAM AND
AIMEE LEE CHEEK, JOHN MERCER LANGSTON AND THE FIGHT FOR BLACK FREEDOM, 1829-65,

58 (1993).
219. Woodson v. The State, for the Use of William H. Borland, 17 REPORTS OF CASES
ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 16169 (1849).

220. Id.
221. TESTIMONIAL TO S. P. CHASE, supra note 214, at 22-25.

Summer 2014]

WHAT IS STILL "RADICAL"

319

how arguments proffered for Cincinnati's "colored inhabitants" within the
context of a debt collection case could be accepted by some Democrats as
implicating the rights of white Ohioans as well. 2 22 By this point, Chase
could see a victory for John Woodson, like a victory for Samuel Watson or
a repeal of the state's Black Laws, as producing the same result as
collecting a white boatman's wages under the Watercraft Law: it would be
another way to preserve Jefferson's doctrines of "equal justice" within the
Buckeye State.

Conclusion
By 1848, Chase had finally arrived at the formula that would
consolidate all of the competing elements of his legal practice While still
retaining his identity as a debt collection lawyer, working for a client like
Woodson now folded into Chase's work to repeal the state's Black Laws,
an effort that Chase deemed of such moral import that it would take up
some of the time he usually reserved for Sunday prayers. 223 And
encouraged by statements from some potential white clients that he would
find "friends of his liberty principles . . .among the working class,"224
securing the "equal rights" of Cincinnati's free black population could now
be construed not only as a blow against the "the Slave Power"- defined by
Chase as "the great Slave Interest wielding capital in human beings" 225 but as a rebuke against a larger economic system that existed as an
"antagonist to free labor" threatening the commercial prospects of his
hardscrabble white clients as well.226
In the 1830s, Chase's banking work had attempted to place America's
larger "Money Power" comfortably within the bounds of law. Now, while
still forming the basis of his legal expertise, his debt collection work for
banks was replaced by service for an insurgent, multiracial clientele using
banking principles for their own ends.
By mid-1849, Chase had
successfully convinced white members of the state's Democratic Party,
including Nathaniel Read himself, to support repealing Ohio's Black Laws
as a matter of political self-preservation. By the end of that year, he would
enter the U.S. Senate as an "Independent" or "Free" Democrat, further
distancing himself from his Whig past.227
222. The Judge was Matthew Birchard, discussed supra note 128.
223. See Entry for Jan. 7. 1849, in CHASE DIARIES 201.
224. See Letter from John Duffy to Chase (May 21, 1842) (Reel 4, Chase Papers, LC).
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Arriving in Washington, D.C., Chase would now see himself as "but
one of a numerous host," the legal agent for a "moral and political
revolution" that, rather than being forced upon Americans by "men of
standing," was set to "arise among the people." 22 8 As a U.S. Senator during
the 1850s, Chase would present his work in old Jacksonian terms as a grand
dismantling operation. 2 2 9 It would begin with the total divorce of national
institutions "from all support of slavery," and would continue by applying
"the principle of equal rights ... to other prominent questions of Public
Policy," supporting "free trade" while favoring the interests of "labor over
capital" and the distribution of "land for the landless" when he had the
chance.2 3 0 As Treasury Secretary, he would also take the first steps in
attempting to design a post-war Mississippi River Valley trading system
meant to accommodate economic exchange between whites "willing to pay
... days wages for days works," and "black Americans, who till the soil, or
load the boats, & cars, or pursue the handicrafts." 23 1 And as a Chief Justice,
he would spend his final years presiding over the fractious coalition he had
first seen forming within his Cincinnati law office, supporting a vision of
the American state empowering the diverse elements of the nation's
working class to collect its debts on a continental stage.232
He would do all of this while following the path first blazed in his
private practice decades before, exploring a radically egalitarian variant of
American law sometimes only he and his clients retained the stubborn faith
to see. As one successful black barber living in Cincinnati would put it a
few years earlier, Chase's interpretation of American law, once
"pronounced a mere chimera of fanaticism," had become "the established
law of the State." 233 When "Lawyer Chase" returned to Washington, D.C.
in 1849 to take his seat in the U.S. Senate, he did so with the radically
"subaltern" conviction that his interpretation would soon be affirmed as the
one true law of all of the land.
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